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NOTES
INTER-UNION DISPUTES AND THE EMPLOYER
1. THE EMjPLOYER S DILEMMA UNDER ANTE-INJUNCTIONx AND
LABOR RELATIONS STATUTES*
AN i m. ATuRE collective bargaining process must necessarily be charac-
terized by controversy between labor organizations, as well as by the tradi-
tional warfare of employer and employee. Internal strife in the ranks of labor,
long a feature of American labor history, has been aggravated immensely by
the AFL-CIO schism.1 In this conflict, the employer is sometimes an active
participant-at times even an instigator; but sometimes he may be an innocent
victim. Several typical situations may be distinguished: First is the case in
which A's employees are, voluntarily or otherwise, not unionized and the X
union proceeds against A's business in order to effect unionization. Second,
A may be dealing with the Y union as the representative of his employees
and the X union proceeds against him to effect a substitution. In the third
situation, the X union proceeds against A, not for the purpose of displacing
Y altogether but in order to secure separate recognition of X as the repre-
sentative of those of A's employees who are members of X whether they con-
stitute a majority or a minority of his employees in the appropriate bargain-
ing unit.2 In each of these situations, X may employ any or all of the usual
methods of industrial warfare: its members who are employees of A may
strike; it may picket A's place of business and otherwise seek to persuade
third persons, workers, suppliers or customers, not to deal with A directly
or indirectly; and its members and workers who are members of affiliated
unions may refuse to handle or work on goods coming from or destined
for A.
Before the enactment of anti-injunction statutes and the national and state
labor relations acts, an employer faced with one of these situations could
choose among three courses of conduct. He could resist the union's demands
and accept its challenge for a test of economic power. He could submit to
its demands and seek to compel his dissident employees to acquiesce. Or he
could, at least in some courts, secure an injunction, or other legal redress,
against the activities of the X union and its affiliates.
The anti-injunction statutes have restricted the availability of the last course
by prohibiting an injunction against some forms of conduct in a labor dis-
* Union Premier Food Stores, Inc., et al. v. Retail Food Clerks and Managers Union,
Local No. 1357 et al., 98 F. (2d) 821, 825 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
L For background and list of authorities, see Comment (193S) 3 CoL L Rc%.
1243.
2. Another common type of inter-union conflict, tile jurisdictional dispute as to
whether certain work is to be done by one craft or another, does not involve primarily
the issue of representation and is not relevant to this discussion.
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pute.3 The labor relations acts 4 have further restricted the employer's choice.
On the one hand, he is not permitted to resist the union's demand for recog-
nition as the representative for collective bargaining if the union is chosen
as such representative by a majority of his employees in the appropriate bar-
gaining unit.5 On the other hand, he is not permitted to yield to the union's
demand and bargain with it, if such a majority has chosen a different repre-
sentative; and he is not permitted to influence the employees' choice.0
An employer may thus be placed in the unenviable position of having to
choose only between violating the labor relations act or suffering the harm
caused by the X union's conduct, unless some legal redress for that harm
is available. Accordingly, it has been urged that, in view of the labor relations
acts, the anti-injunction statutes should not be construed as prohibiting in-
junctions against union activity ordinarily within those statutes when sub-
mission by the employer to the union's demands would necessitate his violating
the labor relations acts.7
So far this issue has been raised chiefly in the federal courts with relation
to the federal statutes. s Most of the prayers for injunctive relief were made
prior to the institution of representation proceedings before the NLRB.0 The
typical case is that in which one group of employees has been granted recog-
nition by the employer as a collective bargaining agency and a rival group
3. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 101 (1934). Senn v. Tile Layers Protective
Union, 301 U. S. 468 (1936); Lauf v. Shinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323 (1938); New Negro
Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery, Inc., 303 U. S. 552 (1938), amended, 304 U. S. 542 (1938).
The states with similar legislation are listed in (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1064, n. 1. Fr
treatment of statutes by state courts, see id., notes 6-15.
4. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 (Supp. 1938). Although at present only
five states (Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah and Wisconsin) have labor
relations acts, the concerted effort of labor to force their enactment may bring an increase
in their number within the near future. Legis. (1938) 51 HARv. L. REV. 722.
5. WAGNER Acr, § 8 (5).
6. WAGNER AcT, § 8 (1).
7. See discussion of employer's argument in cases cited infra, note 9. See Magruder,
A Half Century of Legal Influence Upon the Dcvelopment of Collective arabibiy
(1937) 50 HARv. L. REV. 1071, 1107.
8. Hence, only N. L. R. A. cases will hereafter be discussed. There have also been
a few suits in courts in states which have laws similar to both of the federal acts. Bachi-
ski v. Douglass, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 30, 1937, p. 1905, col. I (Sup. Ct.) ; Buy-Wise Mar-
kets, Inc. v. Winokur, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 26, 1938, p. 985, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.).
9. Lund v. Woodenware Workers Union et al., 19 F. Supp. 607 (D. Mitn. 1937):
Grace Co. v. Williams, 20 F. Supp. 263 (W. D. Mo. 1937), aff'd, 96 F. (2d) 478 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1938) ; Cupples Co. v. American Fed. of Labor et al., 20 F. Supp. 894 (E. D. Mo.
1937); Donnelly Garment Co., et al. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union
et al., 21 F. Supp. 807 (W. D. Mo. 1937), reild on jurisdictional grounds, 304 U. S, 243
(1938); id., 23 F. Supp. 998 (W. D. Mo. 1938), rev'd and remanded, 99 F. (2d) 309
(C. C. A. 8th, 1938); Houston & North Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Local Union
No. 886 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, et al., 24 F. Supp. 619 (W. D.
Okla. 1938); Sharpe & Dohme v. Storage Warehouse Employees Union, Local No.
18571 et al., 24 F. Supp. 701 (E. D. Pa. 1938) ; Blankenship et al. v. Kurfman et al., 96 F.
(2d) 450 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938) (petition by union). Cases have also been brought in
the'state courts on the basis of the federal act. Eastwood-Nealley Corp. v. International
Ass'n of Machinists, Dist. No. 47, e al., 124 N. J. Eq. 274, 1 A. (2d) 477 (Ch. 1038).
of employees seeks, by picketing and other pressures, to secure recognition
for itself. The employer's prayer is based on the claim that, since he is bar-
gaining with the union which he believes to represent a majority of his
employees in the appropriate unit, he is entitled to protection, despite the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, until such time as the defendant union proves its
right to recognition through the machinery of the NLRA. But the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, which deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunc-
tions against peaceful "patrolling" in cases involving "labor disputes", on
its face bars his request. Since the Act defines "labor dispute" to include
controversies concerning the terms of employment, whether or not the dis-
putants are in the relation of employer and employee,10 the courts uniformly
agree that the described situation does involve a "labor dispute" within the
meaning of the Act. 1 Injunctive relief has been denied for the further reason
that, while the NLRA provides a method of settling disputes concerning repre-
sentation, resort to it is not mandatory, and the Norris-LaGuardia Act contin-
ues to be applicable when that method is not invoked. 2- If tile union accorded
recognition by the employer clearly represents a majority and the defendant
union does not, this latter ground of decision seems improper. To be sure,
resort to the Wagner Act is not mandatory. But certification of a representa-
tive by the NLRB is equally not a condition precedent to the employer's
duty to bargain with the representative of a majority. He is under a duty
so to -bargain when majority representation is established as a fact in any
other way. Certification by the Board is merely one means of establishing
this fact. 13 *W\hen majority representation is established either by Board cer-
tification or otherwise, the employer commits an unfair labor practice if he
refuses to bargain with the majority representative or bargains with the repre-
10. NORRIS-LAGUARDIA Acr, § 13(c).
11. In addition to cases cited in note 9, supra: Washington Shoe Workers' Union
et al. v. United Shoe Workers of Am., et al., 1-A L. R. REr. VM.A. 647 (D. D. C. 1937)
(denied to both employer and union); M & M Woodworking, Co. v. Plywood and Veneer
Workers Local Union No. 102, ct al., 23 F. Supp. 11 (D. Ore. 1938), semble. Contira:
John F. Trommer, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Brewery Workers of Greater N. Y., Inc.,
N. Y. L. J., March 16, 1938, p. 1299, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.). For a full discussion of this point,
see (1939) 33 ILi. L. RET. 717.
12. See Donnelly Garment Co., et al. v. International Ladies Garment Workers'
Union et al., 23 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (V. D. Mo. 1937), (1939) 39 CoL L Rsv. 519;
-Sharpe & Dohme v. Storage Warehouse Employers Union, Local No. 18571 el al., 24 F.
Supp. 701, 703 (E. D. Pa. 1938). But see Lund v. W1oodenware Workers Union et al.,
19 F. Supp. 607, 610 (D. Minn. 1937) ; Blankenship et al. ,. Kurfman c al., 96 F. (2d)
450, 454 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
13. The certification procedure may be briefly outlined. Upon the filing of the peti-
tion by an employee group or union declaring that a controversy over representation
e~xsts, the Board orders an investigation and authorizes a hearing at which evidence of
the conflicting claims may be introduced. If the hearing is inconclusive, the Board then
conducts elections in the appropriate units of the concern to determine the employees'
preference. The NLRB receives its authority to certify from § 9 of the X. L. R. A., 49
STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 159 (Supp. 1937). For a detailed discussion of the proced-
ure, see Rice, The Determination of Emnployce Representatives (1938) 5 LAw AND CIO-
TEMP. PROB. 188.
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sentatives of both the majority and minority. In such a case, therefore, it
seems immaterial whether or not there has been resort to the NLRA.
Usually, however, majority representation is hotly contested and is not
definitely established as a fact prior to certification by the NLRB. If an
injunction were to be granted in this case, the employer would be permitted
to make a provisional determination of this issue for the period required for
a determination by the NLRB 14 and his provisional determination may vitally
affect the final outcome. On the other hand, if an injunction is denied, the
employer is subjected to the hardship of a continuing active labor dispute.
But he may be able in some cases to ameliorate this hardship. Under existing
regulations of the Board, he is not permitted to institute representation pro-
ceedings himself. That is not a serious obstacle, however, since he frequently
is able to induce one or the other of the employee groups to start the pro-
ceedings, either by refusing to recognize either group until certification by
the NLRB, or otherwise. But this will not afford him relief if one of the
unions persists in its conduct despite the pendency of the NLRB proceedings.
His most hopeful course then is to recognize each union as the representative
for its members and bargain with each accordingly. 15 This he may do with
out violating the NLRA since, ex hypothesi, majority representation has not
been satisfactorily established.";
After the issue of representation has been settled by certification of a
representative by the NLRB, one court has enjoined economic pressure by
the defeated minority despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 17 Several explana-
tions have been advanced for this inroad on the anti-injunction legislation. It
is said that Subsection 10(h) of the Wagner Act has removed the inhibitions
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act by providing that the latter does not apply to
the courts when "granting appropriate temporary relief or a restraining order,
or . . . enforcing . . .an order of the Board . . . "'I However, both the
wording and the history of Section 10 indicate that it refers only to direct
review of Board orders by the Circuit Courts of Appeals pursuant to that
Section.' 0 Another argument is that after certification there is no "labor
dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act but only a settled
14. The period varies on the average from 2 to 6 months. This length of time re-
quired by the Board to complete the certifidation is an estimate from a sample of 24
representative cases in volumes 4 and 5 NLRB. It includes only the time from the
order that an investigation be held to the final certification decision, and not from the
initial filing of a petition.
15. For a discussion of possible alternatives open to the employer, see Comment
(1938) 38 CoL. L. REv. 1243, 1262-1266.
16. As to closed shop problems, not here discussed, see (1939) 48 YALt L. J. 10,9.
17. Oberman & Co., Inc. v. United Garment Workers of Am., 21 F. Supp. 20 (W.
D. Mo. 1937). See Union Premier Food Stores, Inc. et al. v Retail Food Clerks and
Managers Union, Local No. 1357, et al., 98 F. (2d) 821, 826 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938).
18. See Oberman & Co., Inc. v. United Garment Workers of Am., et al., 21 F. Supp,
20, at 26 (W. D. Mo. 1937).
19. See Houston & North Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Local Union No. 886 of
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 24 F. Supp. 610, 639 (V. D. Okla. 1938"). For
history see 1 Prentice-Hall 1937 Lab. Serv. f 15,515.
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labor dispute or a mere controversy in connection with NLRA procedure.2
This view appears untenable, for the Norris-LaGuardia Act e-pressly covers
controversies between two or more associations of employees in the same
trade or industry, and a contest for recognition is such a controversy-"L A
third contention is that enactment of the NLPA impliedly repealed incon-
sistent provisions of the earlier Norris-LaGuardia Act.2 The argument is
that application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to situations of the kind under
discussion would render ineffectual the majority rule principle of the NLRA
and that the latter act must be taken, therefore, as limiting the applicability
of the former.2
Conflict between the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRA should not
be assumed too readily. In a sense there is no possibility of conflict, for the
Norris-LaGuardia Act affects only the remedy by way of injunction. -' It is
entirely conceivable that dissatisfaction with the role of federal equity courts
in labor disputes and with "government by injunction" is sufficient reason
for withdrawing the equitable remedy under the circumstances stated in the
Act whether a labor relations act is present or absent.2 Exclusive reliance
may have been placed on other remedies, available at least theoretically.20
Yet it may be doubted whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRAIk
would be 1assed in their present form by the same legislature at the same time.
A chief hope in the enactment of the Wagner Act was that it would tend
to eliminate the great number of labor disputes with employers relating to
representation of employees in collective bargaining and union" recognition.- r
20. See Oberman & Co., Inc. v. United Garment Workers of Am., et at., 21 F. Supp.
20, 25 (\V. D. Mo. 1937); Union Premier Food Stores, Inc., et ol. v. Retail Food Clerks
and 'Managers Union, Local No. 1357 et al., 98 F. (2d) 821, 825 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938)
(during certification proceedings).
21. See Larson, The Labor Relations Acts-Their Effect on Industrial lI'arfare
(1938) 36 MicH. L. REv. 1237, 1280, n. 150.
22. Union Premier Food Stores v. Retail Food Clerks and Managers Union, 93 F.
(2d) 821 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938), criticized in (1938) 52 H. rv. L. Ray. 3-7.
23. The Supreme Court has declared that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not forbid
the granting of a mandatory injunction to the majority union under the Railway Labor
Act, thus indicating the power of the courts to give effect to a later act by derogating a
previous statute. Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 553
(1937). But evidence of legislative intent against implied repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act is contained in the declaration in § 13 of the Wagner Act that nothing therein is to
be interpreted as interfering in any way with the right to strike. This construction is
bolstered by the absence of any such provision in the Railway Labor Act, whieh pro-
vides merely in § 9 (8): "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to require an indi-
vidual employee to render labor or service without his consent, nor shall anything in this
Act be construed to make the quitting of his labor or service by an individual employee
an illegal act . . ." (Italics supplied). The interpretation is further supported by the
fact that the injunction in the Viroinian R3y. case was issued at the request of a union
against an employer.
24. "No court . . . shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order . . ." 47
STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 104 (1934).
25. See generally FRAxKFURTER AND GREENE. THE LAOR I.JtUxcuo: (1930).
26. See Comment (1938) 38 CoL- L. Ray. 1243, 1265, notes 162-165.
27. See Findings and Declaration of Policy, § 1 of the ,VANGNR- AcT.
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Realization of that hope is diminished when the NLRA machinery is not
employed to settle representation disputes definitively.
.Consideration of this possible conflict must take account, however, of
several important factors. First, if the union defeated in representation pro.
ceedings before the NLRB is to be restrained from exerting economic pres-
sure against the employer to achieve its ends, it may well demand a remedy
for attacking the legality of the Board's determination. Thus far, directjudicial review by the Circuit Courts of Appeals of the Board's certification
on the ground of illegality in the election or in the determination of the
appropriate bargaining unit has been denied because neither the certification
nor the determination is a final order.28 The propriety of this result is clear
insofar as review on appeal by the employer is concerned; he may procure
the desired review when the Board issues its cease and desist order. But
the defeated union is in a different position. For it the certification is fairly
final. It does not have the employer's opportunity to force further proceed-
ings resulting in a cease and desist order; and it may not have any other
opportunity to secure the desired review. The suggestion has been made,
therefore, that the union may procure review by a bill in equity in the ordinary
equity jurisdiction of the federal district courts.20 This would seem to create
a needless technical complication. If review is to be had at thi instance
of the defeated union, there is little reason for not making it available in the
regular manner of appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Secondly, thb action of the defeated union may not be directed to a change
of representation but to other labor ends, such as increase in wages, shortening
of hours or improvement in other conditions of labor. Disputes of this kind
relate to disagreement with the employer, with the rival union, or with both,
on matters involved in the collective bargain. On such issues the NLRA is
irrelevant. Restraint of the defeated union's action must therefore depend
upon careful ascertainment of the union's objectives; and that may cteate
undue risks of error or abuse.
Thirdly, it may be necessary to discriminate between cases in which the
employer's employees are engaged in collective bargaining through an inde-
pendent, bona fide labor organization and those in which they are not so
engaged.30 The policy in favor of collective bargaining may justify effort to
effect unionization at all times-at least until all suspicion of employer in-
fluence in the maintenance of non-unionization is dissipated. And finally,
restraint of a defeated union's use of economic pressure creates dangers of
undesirable stratification. To-day's majority is frequently yesterday's minor-
ity. Some opportunity for change must be left open.31 The pressure of the
28. United Employees' Ass'n v. N. L. R. B., 96 F. (2d) 875 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938).
This is also the opinion of the Board itself, 2 REP. N. L. R. B. (1937) 105; Comment(1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1243, at 1253. The same view obtains with respect to a state
act. In re Wallach's, Inc. v. Boland, 277 N. Y. 345, 14 N. E. (2d) 381 (1938).
29. See American Federation of Labor et al. v. N. L. R. B., 4 L. R. R. 34, 35 (App.
D. C. 1939).
30. See BROOKS, WHEN LABOR ORGANIZES (1937) 89-95; CnAhACTERISTICS or
COM.%PANY UNIONS (U. S. Dep't Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. 637, 1937)
42-45.
31. See (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1059, 1063.
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defeated union affects not only the employer but also the employees in the
majority. The aim of the pressure may be to compel capitulation by the
majority. That the employer may suffer as an innocent bystander caught in
this struggle between other parties is not an unusual phenomenon in labor
disputes or in business generally. Nevertheless, mitigation of such conse-
quences is always desirable if it can be accompliihed with a fair regard for
the other interests involved. The most satisfactory solution would be legis-
lative clarification of the situation, taking into account the foregoing factors.
Pending this outcome, a court, though in some cases justifiably disposed to
overlook the letter of the anti-injunction statutes, should similarly avoid the
dangers pointed out above. Only an extreme instance of conflict of policy
between the statutes can justify the issuance of an injunction, and even then,
compliance with all the procedural safeguards of anti-injunction legislation
should be required. -
2. EFFECT OF EMPLOYEES' CHANGE OF UNION AFFILIATION UPON A
CLOSED SHOP CONTRACT
AmONG the many problems created by inter-union rivalry, few are more
perplexing than the status of a closed shop contract when the contracting
union has been decimated by a sudden change of affiliation. The factual
background of a complicated case recently before the NLRB and two federal
courts points the typical issues. The employees of the plywood plant of the
M & M Woodworking Company had organized as a federal local under the
AFL. In 1935 the AFL changed the local's federal status and placed it
under the jurisdiction of the Carpenters' Union. With the local thus affiliated
the company signed a ten month collective labor contract containing a closed
shop clause. Five months later, frustrated in their efforts to secure a "rank
and file" voice in their relations with the Carpenters' Union,' and attracted by
the overtures of CIO organizers, the employees indicated in two preliminary
ballots a distinct desire to transfer the local's affiliation.2 At a meeting called
for the purpose of voting on a formal dissolution, the local "went CIO" with
but one dissent, and returned its charter to the AFL. In the meantime a
general AFL boycott to enforce the contract had forced the plywood plant
to close down.3 After the lone dissenter had rounded up 29 of the 515 em-
32. Section 107. Cf. Grace Co. v. Williams el al., 20 F. Supp. 263 (NV. D. Mo. 1937).
* M & M Woodworklng Co. v. N. L. R. B., 4 L. R. R. 36 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
1. The schism among the lumber workers in the Northwest is discussed in M~mils,
AmElicAN L~M0R (1939) 170-172.
2. The first count revealed that 89% were in favor of affiliating with the CIO. At
a second ballot, taken after the employees were addressed by representatives of both the
Carpenters' Union and the CIO, they were again "overwhelmingly" in favor of te
change.
3. The second vote, mentioned supra note 2. took place on August 31, 1937. Sep-
tember 1, the AFL boycott began. September 8, the plant closed. September 12, the AFL
charter was returned and a CIO charter installed.
NOTES 1059
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ployees into the old AFL local, the plant reopened with only AFL men.4
Picketing by the discharged employees forced the plant to close down again,
but it later reopened with a police guard. When the picketing continued, the
company applied for an injunction in a federal district court. Concurrently,
the CIO filed charges of unfair labor practice and sought reinstatement for
its members from the Natibnal Labor Relations Board.
The federal district court categorically expressed its belief that the pickets
were rightfully discharged, but withheld an injunction pending amendment
of the pleadings.5 The Board shortly thereafter found the discharge wrong-
ful and ordered reinstatement without back pay.6 The company complied,
undertook curtailed operations hiring men of both affiliations, 7 and petitioned
the Circuit Court to review the Board's order. More than a year later, the
court, over a vigorous dissent, reversed that order and substantially reiterated
the viewpoint of the district court.8 The conflicting decisions of the courts
and the Board suggest three possible approaches to a closed shop clause when
a change of affiliation has occurred: the closed shop provision may still apply
in favor of the original contracting union; it may be abrogated altogether;
or its advantages may be transferred to the new union.
In the few cases where the precise issues of the instant case have been
raised, courts have indicated a disposition to enforce the closed shop provi-
sion for the benefit of the deserted union.0 The sui generis collective labor
contract,' 0 it is said, is not between: the employer and his employees, but be-
tween the employer and the local as an entity. Unless the local is dissolved
completely, it can insist upon carrying out its contract with the employer.
Whether those who secede from the local are few or many, they lose what-
ever advantage they would have under the contract, just as they lose what-
ever interest they have in the funds or property of the local.1 Attention
is focused under this doctrine on relations between the local and 'its members;
4. The 29 who "reorganized" the AFL'local took a new oath of allegiance to tile
Carpenters' Union on September 25, 1937. This local supplied "about 50 men" to reopen
the plant October 6.
5. M & M Woodworking Co.. v. Plywood & Veneer Workers Local No. 102, 23 F.
Supp. 11 '(D. Ore. J938).
6. The Board recognized that the employer had acted in good faith upon legal
advice as to his'duties under the contract. In r'e k & M Woodworking Co., 6 NLRB
372 (1938).
7. -The Oregonian (Portland, Ore) Feb. 18, 1939, p. 3, col. 3.
8.' M & M Woodworking Co. v. N.L. R. B., 4 L. R. R. 36 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939):
Since the contract had expired, the only practical effect of this decision was to overrule the
Board order.
9. Mason Manufacturing Co. v. United Furniture Workers of America, Local No.
576, 2 L. R. R. 838 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1938); Pa. L. R. B. v. Red Star Shoe Repairing
Co., 1 Prentice-Hall Labor Service 119,531 (Pa. C. P. 1937).
10. See, generally, Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts (1938) 48
YALE L. J. 195, and references there cited.
11. Low v. Harris, 90 F. (2d) 783 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), (1938) 47 YALt L. j. 483;
Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union, Local 2623 v. International Wood Workers of
America, Local 49, 85 P. (2d) 1099 (Wash. 1938); Local 2508, Lumber and Sawmill
Workers v. Cairns, 85 P. (2d) 1109 (Wash. 1938); Local 2618, Plywood and Veneer
Workers v. Taylor, 85 P. (2d) 1116 (Wash. 1938).
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these relations are governed, as in other voluntary associations, by the con-
stitution of the parent and the charter, constitution, and by-laws of the
local.-2 Technical dissolution, moreover, can be achieved only by strict com-
pliance with the formalities prescribed in the constitutions, 3 and these usually
permit a negligible number of dissenters to block dissolution and retain the
charter.14 In the instant case, even this minimum requirement was held to
be "waivable" at the Parent's discretion, on the ground that the constitution
is primarily for the benefit of the parent.1 Short of unanimity, then, disso-
lution is seldom possible ;1o and unanimity is a rare occurrence in view of the
rewards in offices and contracts available to the dissenting few.17 Yet it was
on this strict contractual theory that the C. C. A. grounded its decision in the
instant case. The company's contract, the court reasoned, was with the
"Plywood & Veneer Workers Local No. 2531, affiliated with the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners" and, despite the wholesale defec-
ions, the local had not been properly dissolved.
The NLRB has approached the problem from an entirely different angle.
To the Board, the relevant issue is not enforcement of any features of the
contracting union's bargain with the employer, but rather compliance with
the requirements of the Wagner Act.'8 For this purpose, the parties to the
12. Unincorporated associations: McNichols v. International Typographical Union,
63 F. (2d) 490 (C. C. A., 7th, 1933); Martin v. Smith, 286 Mass. 227, 190 N. E. 113
(1934); Weighers, WVarehousemen and Cereal Workers Union v. Green, 157 Ore. 394,
72 P. (2d) 55 (1937) ; ,Gaffney v. Sylvia, 3 L. R. R. 440 (R. I. Super. Ct. 1938); If,-n-
TIN, MODERN LAiW OF LAOR UNIoNs (1910) § 287; cf. Chafee, The Intcnal Affairs of
Associations not for Profit (1930) '43 H~Av. L. RE,. 993, 1008. Incorporated Associa-
tions: Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc. v. First National Bank, 254 Ill. App. 264
(1928); MeClement v. Supreme Court, I. 0. F., 222 N. Y. 470, 119 N. E. 99 (1918);
Valker v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Inc., 1-A L R. REF. M fAN. 674 (Cal.
Super. Ct 1938); (1938) 2 L. R. R. 364.
13. The Circuit Court particularly emphasizes non-compliance with te formalities
of amending the local constitution, thereby placing an additional barrier in the way
of dissolution. M & If Woodworking Co. v. N. L. R. B., 4 L. IL IL 36, 37 (C C. A.
9th, 1939).
14. E.g., the constitution of the Carpenters' Union provides: "A local union cannot
withdraw from the United Brotherhood or dissolve so long as ten members in good
standing object thereto."
15. See 4 L. R. R. 36 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939); 23 F. Supp. 11, IS (D. Ore. 1933).
16. 'here dissolution of a union holding a closed shop contract did occur, one court
held that the rights in that contract were distributed among the former members of the
union and hence the closed shop was ended. Cassetana v. Filling Station Operators
Union Local, 1-A L. R. REF. MAx. 672 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1937).
17. Where the union is unanimous in its change of affiliation, courts rule that the
change no more alters its legal relations than an individual's change of name. World
Trading Co. v. Kolchin, 166 Misc. 854, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 195 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (contract
duties); Kelso v. Cavanaugh, 137 Misc. 653, 244 N. Y. Supp. 90 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (prop-
erty rights); Shipwrights, Joiners and Colliers v. Mitchell, 60 Wash. 529, 111 Pa=. 780
(1910) (funds); Laborite v. Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers' Union, 86 P. (2d)
189 (Wash. 1938) (contract duties). The Board rules similarly as to a certified union
representative. In re American -awaiian Steamship Co., 3 L. R. RL 687 (N. L. R. B.
1939).
18. 49 STAT. 452, § 7 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 157 (Supp. 1938).
1062 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48
contract must be regarded as the employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit; the union is merely the designated agent through whom they negotiate
the agreement. 19 The employees may be bound by its every term except that
which restricts their free choice of the bargaining agent ;20 this right, guaran-
teed in the Wagner Act, has been consistently placed paramount to all con-
tracts by the Board.2 ' Only where a statutory representative has been desig-
nated will the Board refuse to consider a new question of representation with-
in a reasonable time after certification.22  The Board found it unnecessary
to decide in the M & JM case whether the closed shop provision should be
terminated when the contracting union loses its majority status, or whether
the closed shop should be retained for the benefit of the union to which the
majority of the employees had transferred their affiliation.2 3 Adoption of
either alternative yields the result that the company, irrespective of its inten-
19. Collective labor contracts are given effect under various theories. See Witmer,
loc. cit. supra note 10; Comments (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1221; (1938) 51 HA.y. L. REV.
521.
20. See N. L. R. B. v. Sands Manufacturing Co., 6 U. S. L. WEEK 87, 889 (U. S.
Sup. Ct. 1939). (Employees held to a substantive term of their collective contract-i.e.,
one not dealing with a choice of representatives). "The whole process of collective bar-
gaining and unrestricted choice of representatives assumes the freedom of employees to
change their representatives while at the same time continuing the existing agreements
under which the representatives must function." In re New England Transportation Co.,
1 NLRB 130, 138 (1936). In re Black Diamond Steamship Corp., 2 NLRB 241, 245
(1936) ; In re Swayne and Hoyt, Ltd., 2 NLRB 282, 287 (1936); see criticism in Rice,
The Determination of Employee Representatives (1938) 5 LAW & CONTEMP. Ptou.
188, 199.
21. This is true whether the contract be between two unions [In re Texas Co.,
4 NLRB 182 (1937)] or between an employer and a union. In rc American France Line
et al., 3 NLRB 64 (1937). And as the parties to the contract make no difference, neither
do its representation terms. In re Hubinger Co., 4 NLRB 428 (1937) (contract for an
exclusive bargaining agency); In re Northrup Corp., 3 NLRB 228 (1937) (contract of
majority union to represent only its members); In re California Wool Scouring Co.,
5 NLRB 782 (1938) (closed shop for contracting union). See Rice, supra note 20, at 194.
Two recent decisions indicate that a bona fide contract may be given effect as to its
representation terms if those terms do not fix the choice of bargaining agents for more
than a reasonable time under the circumstances. In re Superior Electrical Products Co.,
6 NLRB 19 (1938) (one year); In re National Sugar Refining Co., 3 L. R. R. 685
(NLRB 1938) (eleven months). See statement of Madden, Chairman of NLRB, 57 Pito-
CEEDINGS, A. F. oF L. CONVENTION (1937) 236; Comment (1938) 38 CoL. L. REv.
1243, 1251.
22. Rice, supra note 20 at 199.
23. The decisions of the state labor relations boards show the same focus upon the
bargaining unit instead of the union. In re Red Star Shoe Repairing Co., 1-A L. R. REF'.
MAN. 566 (Pa. L. R. B. 1937), rez'd, Pa. L. R. B. v. Red Star Shoe Repairing Co., 1
Prentice-Hall Labor Service 119,531 (1937). Compare Matter of Crystal Cab Corp.,
N. Y. L. R. B., No. S. E. 4325 (1938) (contract upheld) with Matter of Picarillo,
2 'L. R. R. 267 (N. Y. L. R. B. 1938) and Matter of Triboro Coach Corp., 2 L. R.
R. 332 (N. Y. L. R. B. 1938) (election ordered despite closed shop contract). The
Rules and Regulations of the New York Labor Relations Board, Art. III, § 11, prescribe
a one year term for certification, but exceptions are made "where unusual or extraordinary
circumstances require."
tions, was guilty of an unfair labor practice in discharging its employees for
refusing to remain members of a union no longer representing the majority. -4
The status of a closed shop after a transfer of affiliation may be ques-
tioned by other methods in addition to those employed in the 31 & M case.
Either labor group, or both, might sue the employer for specific performance
of the dosed shop clause.2 5 If the employer accepts one of the alternatives,
the favored group or the employer, or both, might sue to enjoin picketing
or boycotting by the "outside" union on the ground that it was calculated
to induce breach of contract.20 And, of course, there might also be damage
suits on the same grounds.27 This multitude of ways in which the issue may
arise, the variety of tribunals which may decide it at substantially the same
time, and the severe consequences of wrong guesses by the employers or em-
ployees-all indicate the desirability of adopting one consistent solution
which will satisfy as completely as possible all the interests involved.2 9
Most appealing to the deserted union is the attitude of the courts, as exem-
plified by the majority decision in the -1 & .1 case. The closed shop con-
tract is the most prized achievement of unionism.20 It adds membership and
compulsory dues. By holding out to loyal members a promise of employment
in the closed shop, it welds group solidarity. With the closed shop in force,
the employer cannot raise a question of representation during negotiations.
As far as the established union is concerned, therefore, a decision allowing
seceding members to take the closed shop with them, or to nullify it, would
render ineffective the union's strongest deterrent against withdrawals and
changes of affiliation.3 0
But this disposition of the closed shop clause seems too high a price to pay
for an intra-union disciplinary measure. The employees as individuals may
have a large interest in asserting their independence of union officials whom
they think guilty of self-aggrandizement, short-sightedness, or favoritism.3'
If the closed shop contract is perpetuated with the old union, any benefits
which the employees may have received in the closed shop itself would, under
the circumstances, be outweighed by the entrenchment of the very element
opposed by the rank and file. Consequently, from the enployees' standpoint,
24. 49 STAT. 452, § 8 (3) (1935), 29 U. S. C. L § 158 (3) (Supp. 1938).
25. E.g., International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. Local Union B. 1073
v. National Electrical Products Corp., 1 Prentice-Hall Labor Service footnote f15,642
(\V. D. Pa. July 29, 1937), (1938) 47 Y.tLE L. J. 799.
26. Witmer, supra note 10, at 199 et seq.
27. By employer or union against either union. Ibid.
28. It is important to note that the Board view conflicts with that of the courts
only in respect to the disposition of the closed shop clause. See supra, note 20.
29. See, e.g., BEMAN, Sn.zcLrED ARtcLEs ON THE CLOSED SnoP (2d ed. 1922);
Leiserson, Closed Shop and Open Shop (1930) 3 ENc c. Soc. Sczr cs 56S.
30. The concern of the deserted union is evidenced by recent amendments to the
Wagner Act suggested by the AFL and proposed by Senator Walsh. S. 101)0, 76th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1939). One provision would stipulate that a change of affiliation shall
not impair the exclusive bargaining agency until (1) the term of the written contract
is up, or (2) one year has expired since its execution. See Amendments to the Iagncr
Act: 1I (1939) 7 I. J. A. BULL 85, 93.
31. See HARRis, AmERICAx LABOR (1939).
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either of the Board's alternatives seems preferable to the court's solution,
for the employees are then not placed in the dilemma of losing their jobs or
forfeiting their statutory right to bargain through true representatives. 2 As
between the two Board alternatives, if a choice should be necessary,33 abro-
gation of the clause altogether would tend to punish employees for exercising
their bargaining rights; transfer of the closed shop to the new majority
group, on the other hand, would preserve for these employees all of the bene-
fits which they obtained as members of the closed shop union.
Contrary to the court's assumptions, the interest of the employer may prob-
ably better be protected by transferring the closed shop provision to the new
group. In signing a closed shop contract, the employer primarily bargains
for stability during the life of the contract. His ability to forecast operating
costs and to fulfill orders depends to a large extent on maintaining continuity
of personnel and operation. This he can best accomplish by avoiding, first, a
high rate of turnover among his experienced workers and, second, labor
sanctions so paralyzing as boycotts and picket lines.34
Greater stability of personnel might, of course, be achieved if the court's
view has the general effect of dissuading changes of affiliation during the
term of the closed shop contract, 35 for the ill & I decision may, to some
extent, deter organizers of the outside union from concentrating on a plant
operating under another contract. But, as pointed out above, the forfeiture
of statutory rights during this period does not accord with the policies of the
Wagner Act. Once a change of affiliation has occurred-and whatever rule
is adopted, the court or Board will usually be confronted with a fait accom-
pli-it is patent that a decision which enforces an agreement with a decimated
32. The dilemma of the minority who must choose between losing their jobs or
changing their affiliation to that of the majority is only the same dilemma of every
minority when a closed shop is affected. See Williams v. Quill, 277 N. Y. 1, 12 N. E.
(2d) 547 (1938).
33. Either in the courts or before the NLRB, the employer having chosen one of the
Board's alternatives.
34. The M1 & M Woodworking Company's contract provided: "The company will
not be requested by the union to participate in any dispute regarding jurisdiction which
may arise between the union and any other labor organization." See Gall and Smethurst,
Amending the Wagner Act: The Problem From the Manufacturer's Viewpoint (1938)
5 LAw & CONTFimsP. PROB. 306.
35. The Special Master: "... if you and the other members of 2531 [A. F. L.
local] could have received an authoritive opinion or some legal decision holding that
this contract of May 3, 1937, was a valid, binding contract, would you then have con-
tinued as employees of the Plywood plant and as members of 2531?
A. ". . . if we were certain that we would break our agreement by changing our
affiliation . . . all the members would have been in favor of fulfilling the contract." Tes-
timony included in the Report of Special Master in Chancery in M & M Woodworking
Co. v. Plywood & Veneer Workers Local No. 102, 23 F. Supp. 11 (D. Ore. 1938).
Stability of personnel might also be encouraged without resort to the court view if
the Board impressed a stamp of finality upon a certified union for a specified period.
But this would be too rigid a formula. More sensible is the Board's present flexible
policy of considering an issue involving representation closed for a "reasonable time" after




union and requires the discharge of a complete staff does not satisfy the
employer's desire for a stable personnel. On the other hmnd, transfer of the
dosed shop to the majority group enables him to continue to hire the same
employees. In exceptional circumstances, it is true, an employer might inter-
pose the objection that he would not have made the same type of contract
if he had known that his employees would be represented by the new group.
For examlile, the privilege of using a certain union label and the bargaining
attitude of the officials of the contracting union might have been motivating
factors in his entering the dosed shop contract.36 If the v-alidity of such an
objection could be proved, the interests of this employer might better be satis-
fied by terminating the dosed shop, even at the expense of thus chastising
the employees. But the employer would still be under a duty to bargain with
the majority of his employees, and presumably they would again seek the
closed shop with resulting economic pressure upon the employer. In any
event, one of the Board's alternatives, and not the court's, would prove most
satisfactory.
The employer's second major interest, freedom from labor's powerful
sanctions in a purely inter-union struggle, is unfortunately likely to be im-
paired whatever alternative is adopted. But, as pointed out elsewhere in this
issue, this must be regarded as a risk to which all employers are subject37
It need only be shown that the employer, on the whole, is not likely to suffer
more under the Board's preferable view than under the court view. If Norris-
LaGuardia type statutes are construed as written, the employer will be unable
to obtain relief from peaceful picketing or boycotts by either group or their
cohorts.38 On the other hand, if the jurisdiction is one which would issue an
injunction to an employer caught in a purely inter-union displte, 0 the activi-
ties of the deserted union may be as consistently enjoined under the preferred
Board view as those of the new union under the present court view.
The majority opinion in the J1 &1 1 case has satisfied the primary demand
of all the interests involved for some authoritative ruling on the status of
closed shop contracts after a change of affiliation. But its choice seems an
ill-considered one. Since the court had no compelling precedents to follow-
the precise issue has been adjudicated previously in only a few lower courts40
-its decision can probably best be explained on two grounds. The court
may have been carried away by conventional contract concepts, especially
by cases involving the disposition of union funds and property.4' But union
funds may be distributed according to contracts within the union alone;
36. The anomalies which may result from a substitution of the new agency in the
administration of the existing contract have been considered in Rice, sitpra note 20, at
199.
37. See (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1053 passim.
38. Ibid.
39. E.g., United Electric Coal Companies v. Rice, 80 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 7th,
1935), (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1320.
40. See cases cited supra notes 9 and 16. Ci. United Electric Coal Companies v.
Rice, 80 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), (1936) 45 YAL L. J. 13-0.
41. Low v. Harris, 90 F. (2d) 783 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), (1938) 47 YA.. L. J. 483;
Weighers, Warehousemen, Cereal Workers Union v. Green, 157 Ore. 394, 72 P. (2d)
55 (1937).
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employer-employee relations are governed by rights created by statute. The
other factor leading to the court's decision may have been the unenviable
position of the employer as a result of the AFL boycott. But this view fails
to notice that similar sanctions are available to employees affiliated with the
CIO,42 and that against either union the employer will be equally protected
or powerless according to which interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
may be current. For this general type of situation, therefore, the view of the
Board and the Circuit Court of Appeals dissent appear to reflect a more
farsighted evaluation of the interests involved. In subsequent cases, there
may, of course, be variations in the type of industry and character of the
employer unit ;43 the lines of division among employees ;44 the terms of the
contract ;4- the extent of the transfer ;46 the cohesiveness of the parental
ties ;47 the economic weapons available to the various groups. But it is doubt-
ful that such variations will shift the balance of interests to outweigh the
continuous statutory right of the majority to be represented by unions of
their own choosing. 48
42. It has been pointed out, however, that the AFL, controlling the building
trades which utilize vast quantities of processed materials and the teamsters at the trans-
portation bottleneck, is often in a better position to boycott than the industrial CIO.
Comment (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1243, 1262. E.g., In re Star Publishing Co., 4 NLRB
498 (1937), aff'd, N. L. R. B. v. Star Publishing Co., 97 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. 9th,
1938) ; In re Simmons Co., 6 NLRB 208, 211 (1938).
43. For a discussion of inter-union disputes in the shipping industry, see (1939)
48 YALE L. J. 1067. 0
44. Compare facts of In re Superior Electrical Products Co., 6 NLRB 19 (1038) with
those of 11; re Smith Wood Products, Inc., 7 NLRB 950 (1938). That a new certification
would have involved the administration by a craft union for a few members of one de-
partment of the contract made for an industrial unit, no doubt influenced the Board's
decision in the former case.
45. See Check-off and Union Hiring: Typical Contract Clauses (1938) 2 L. R. R.
336. Compare the contract between the American Federation of Hosiery Workers and
the Full-Fashioned Hosiery Manufacturers Association [(1938) 2 L. R. R. 789] with the
contract between the United Agricultural Canning, Packing and Allied Workers (CIO)
and the Mountain States Sugar Beet Growers Association [(1939) 3 L. R. R. 557].
Also compare the contract of Packard Motor Co. and the United Automobile Workers
with those of General Motors and-Chrysler [(1938) 3 L. R. R. 332] in view of the
current factional fight within the U. A. W. [(1939) 3 L. R. R. 667].
46. The transfer may range in extent from a change in connection by the entire
hierarchal organization,-as, for example, transfer of United Mine Workers from the
AFL to the newly formed CIO-to a change by a bare majority of a single local.
47. See deVyver, The Intra-Union Control of Collective Bargainng (1938) 5 LAW
AND CONTEMP. PROB. 288.
48. That the right is a continuous one would seem to be the reasonable interpretation
of § 7 of the Wagner Act. This interpretation has found favor with the Board [see
NLRB decisions cited supra notes 20, 21] and a number of commentators. E.g., Witmer,
supra note 10 at 221; Rice, The Legal Significance of Labor Contracts Un der the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (1939) 37 MicI. L. REv. 693, 723 n. 104. -Cf. Comment
(1938) 51 HARv. L. REv. 520, 533.
3. INTER-UNIoN DISPUTES IN THE SHIPPING INDUSTRY*
A SHIP is both a sailor's home and a floating barracks. In this dual aspect
it reflects the unique status which the law has always reserved for seamen
and their unions.' An increasing responsiveness to the sailor's needs has
resulted in an abundance of remedial and paternalistic legislation which now
spans practically every field except wages.2 But in the shadow of the reformer
has always stood the judicial policeman, rigorously maintaining the traditional
discipline of the sea.3 The earliest decisions condoned beatings by the master
as a necessary incentive to work 4 When the 13th Amendment outlawed in-
voluntary servitude, the Supreme Court thought seamen were different from
other people and so permitted imprisonment for desertion and the use of
court process to return a man to his ship if he tried to quit before the expira-
tion of his contract.5 When the Seamen's Union struck on the Great Lakes
in 1922, the Attorney General ruled that the Department of Commerce could
allow clearance of vessels which did not carry a crew of the required statutory
rating.0 When the shipowners banded together and established a hiring hail
system which completely controlled employment on the West Coast, the courts
found it to be a "peculiarly American institution" and not a violation of the
Anti-Trust laws.7 Similarly, in the face of wide-spread maritime labor unrest,
the comprehensive labor legislation of the past few years has been accorded
*Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 9S F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933),
cert. denied. 59 Sup. Ct. 248 (U. S. 1938).
1. See generally HouRs, WAGES AND WORKING CONDITIONS Im DOMESTic WAsTMe
TRANSPORTATION (Federal Co-ordinator of Transportation, 1936) Vols. I and II; TAY-
LOR, THE SAILORS' UNION OF THE PACIFIC (1923) ; ALu3RECnT, INTERNATIONAL SEAIEN'S
UNION OF AmERIcA (U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 342, 1923) ; Hohman,
Maritime Labour in the United States (1938) 38 IxT. LAMKouR REv. 190 and 376; Eliel,
Labor Problems in our Steamship Business (1937) 26 YALE REv. 510; Robinson, The
Seaman in American Admiralty Lau, (1936) 16 B. U. L. REv. 283; Hearings before the
Conmmittee on Commerce and the Comnmnittee on Education and Labor on S. 3o78, 75th
Cong. 3d Sess. 1938 (hereafter cited as HEaINGS ON S. 3078) ; REror oN TlE STATeS
AN -\VORKING CONDITIONS OF SEAMEN IN THE AMERICA MERCHANT MARInE (sub-
mitted by the International Juridical Association to the Secretary of Commerce, July
24, 1936).
2. 46 U. S. C. A. §§ 221-240, 541-713, 1126-1132, 1251-1262 (192 and Supp. 1938);
LEwIs, SEAMEN's ACT As AMENDED AND OTHER LAWs RFLA-TING TO SEAM N (1938);
MACARTHUR, AMERIcAN SEAMEN- 's LAW (1931). On historical developments, see
Hohman, supra note 1.
3. See Rothschild, The Legal Implications of a Sirike by Scamen (1936) 45 Y1,%
L. J. 1181.
4. Butler v. McClellan, 4 Fed. Cas. No. 2242 (D. Me. 1831). Corporal punishment
is now a misdemeanor. 38 STAT. 1167 (1915), 46 U. S. C 712 (1934); 35 STr. 1145
(1909) 18 U. S. C. § 482 (1934).
5. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275 (1897). See TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 80.
6. (1922) 33 Ops. ATr'y GEN. 367. See TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 1, at 130. 65%
of the crew must be of a rank not less than able-bodied seamen. 38 STAT. 1169 (1915), 46
U. S. C. 672 (1934).
7. Street v. Shipowners' Ass'n, 299 Fed. 5 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924); Anderson v. Ship-
owners'.Ass'n, 10 F. (2d) 96 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926). See Hopkins, Emplojyment Exchanges
for Seamen (1935) 25 Ami. EcoN. REV. 250.
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a restricted application with regard to seamen. Striking seamen aboard ships
have been removed by the admiralty remedy of possessory libel, and attempts
to invoke the Norris-LaGuardia Act have resulted in a reprimand to counsel
for even defending such conduct.8 More recently, in the famous Algic case,"
the doctrine that a shipboard strike is an act of mutiny was reaffirmed despite
the Wagner Act's implied guarantee of the right to strike.10
In the light of this atmosphere it is not surprising that, as the AFL-CIO
schism spread through the ranks of maritime labor, the ravages of inter-union
rivalry should have met with even less tolerance. Typical of this attitude is
a recent decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals1 1 greatly restricting
application of the Wagner Act to the permissible conduct of a shipowner
faced with an inter-union dispute aboard his ship. The Peninsular & Occi-
dental Steamship Co., operating two vessels between Cuba and Florida, had a
preferential hiring agreement with the International Seamen's Union (AFL)
covering unlicensed men, and with other unions affiliated with the AFL
covering officers.12 On June 4, 1937, practically all of the unlicensed personnel
of both vessels transferred to the newly-formed National Maritime Union
(CIO).13 Upon denial of recognition by the shipowner, the NMU staged
a sit-down strike when the vessels were in port. The strike was finally settled
by the Department of Labor after the NLRB had declined, upon request by
the company, to designate the bargaining agency for the crews. After two
weeks of continued shipping, with friction existing between the members of
the rival unions, the few remaining members of the ISU on one vessel refused
to work any longer with NMU men and conducted a sit-down strike. The
company then temporarily laid up both vessels and discharged the entire
crews, the alleged reason being not the sit-down strikes but the continual
strife between the two unions. The company resumed regular schedules a
few days later, and hired only members of the ISU under its agreement. The
NLRB found that the NMU members had been discharged and not rehired
because they had joined the NMU. This was deemed an unfair labor practice
in violation of the Wagner Act and the Board ordered reinstatement with
back pay from the date of discharge.14 The court set aside the order of the
Board, however, on the ground that the men were not discharged for union
activity or membership but because of threats of sabotage and future strikes
which endangered safety at sea. The unlawfulness of the sit-down strike
per se was not in issue, since the~company had settled the first sit-down of
8. The Losmar, 20 F. Supp. 887 (D. Md. 1937); The Oakmar, 20 F. Supp. 650
(D. Md. 1937), (1938) 23 COR. L. Q. 302. Communication to the YALL LAW JOURNAL
from counsel for the seamen, Jan. 15, 1939. See also (1937) 6 I. J. A. BULL. 71.
9. Rees v. United States, 95 F. (2d) 784 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938), (1938) 38 COL.
L. REv. 1294; (1938) 6 I. J. A. BULL. 143.
10. 49 STAT. 457 § 13, 29 U. S. C. § 163 (Supp. 1935).
1i. Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 98 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 5th,
1938).
12. These contracts were entered into before the formation of the NMU in the
fall of 1936. Id. at 412.
13. The dramatic 'story of the rise of the rank and file maritime unions is told in
16 FORTUNE (Sept. 1937) 123.
14. In re Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co., 5 NLRB 959 (1938).
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the NMU by agreement, and had willingly rehired the ISU men who had
conducted the second sit-down.
Prior to 1935, strife among maritime unions was concerned principally
with the question of jurisdiction over particular types of workers.15 Since
the AFL-CIO split, however, inter-union conflict in the shipping industry
exists in a broader sense between two rival national organizations seeking
control over all men to the complete exclusion of the other organization. This
rivalry has developed into unequaled complexity and intensity.10 The hier-
archical organization of shipboard personnel has made possible a situation in
which, with few exceptions, each vessel is manned by licensed deck officers
belonging to an AFL affiliate, licensed engineers belonging to a CIO affiliate,
and an unlicensed crew having either affiliation.', Furthermore, the inter-
relation of the maritime unions with the other transportation workers-lung-
shoremen, warehousemen, and teamsters-has been seriously affected by a
fortuitous geographical division of AFL-CIO strength. The unlicensed sea-
men on the East coast are generally CIO; those on the West Coast are AFL.
On the other hand, the shoreside employees on the East Coast are pre-
dominantly AFL; on the West Coast, except for the teamsters, they are
CIO.' In such a set-up the opportunities for friction at every point in the
transportation process make the problem of inter-union conflicts the most
pressing and continuing of all maritime labor difficulties.
During inter-union conflict, the shipowner is confronted with the same
dilemma as any employer. Faced with two unions each seeking recognition
as exclusive bargaining agent, the employer cannot under the Wagner Act
discharge one group and recognize the other. This would amount to dis-
15. ALBRECHT, op. cit. supra note 1, c. VI; Hoagland, WJ'age Bargaining on tho 1*cs-
scis of the Great Lakes (1917) 6 U. OF ILL. StDItES IN Tn& SOcIAL SCIEZCES NO. 3.
For an excellent discussion of maritime labor organizations just before the AFL-CIO
split, see 1 HoURs, VAGES AND XVoRxsx CoNDIrxONs i- DO.MSTIC WTER TrANsVPI,-
TATioN, supra note 1, at 178 ff.
16. The emergence of new unions and changes in affiliation and jurisdiction among
old unions are still continuing in the maritime labor field. For the best current descrip-
tions see AFL-CIO Rivalrics in Maritime Industries (1938) 2 L R. R. 566; Men of the
Sea and Their Unions, 11 NEWSAVEEK (June 13, 1938) 34. See also N. Y. Times, Mar. 4,
1938, p. 8, col. 4; id., Sept. 2, 1938, p. 10, col. 1; id., Sept. 21, 1938, p. 51, col. 7; id.,
Oct. 15, 1938, p. 35, col. 2; id., Oct. 21, 1938, p. 45, col. 1. The Great Lakes region is
still unorganized except for the tankers and package freighters now under N,.MU agree-
ments.
17. E.g., Nat. Ass'n of 'Masters, Mates, & Pilots (AFL except in New York Caty);
Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n (CIO); Curran's National 'Maritime Union (CIO)
covering all sailors, firemen and cooks; Lundeberg's Seafarers' International Union
(formerly independent Sailors' Union of the Pacific, now AFL); American Radio
Telegraphers' Association (CIO).
18. E.g., Teamsters are AFL on both coasts; Bridges' nt. Longshoremen's and
Varehousemen's Union (CIO) is all-powerful on the west coast except for Tacoma.
where the ILA reigns; Ryan's Int. Longshoremen's Ass'n dominates the east coast
except for New Orleans and fobile and includes tugboatmen; the Inland Boatmen (CIO)
include most of the tugboatmen elsewhere. On the other hand with fading ISU (AFL)
membership the NMU, (CIO) dominates the unlicensed seamen on the cast coast, and'
the newly affiliated SIU (AFL) holds forth on the west coast.
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crimination on account of union membership-an unfair labor practice entitling
the discharged employees to an order of reinstatement from the Board.'t But
the nature of maritime employment has placed at the shipowner's disposal
certain weapons not available to the ordinary employer.
In the first place, the shipowner sometimes disclaims any discrimination
by viewing the expiration of the seamen's statutory contract, i.e., the shipping
articles, as an automatic discharge at the end of each voyage.2 0 In the P. & 0.
case, the court impliedly accepted this argument and disregarded the Board's
claim that the shipping articles were immaterial. It was concluded that under
shipping articles the right of the employer to terminate the employment when
the ship reaches its final destination was unimpaired by the Wagner Art.Y'
This interpretation was applied even though with the short voyages of the
P. & 0. vessels-two and three round trips a week-the custom had been
continually to reship the crew without signing articles for each trip.-" 2 The
effect of this view of the shipping articles is to deny to seamen any protection
under the Wagner Act against discrimination for union activity or member-
ship. It gives to shipping articles an interpretation wholly unwarranted by
their customary connotation. The shipping articles are merely an agreement
in writing according to a statutory form signed by the seamen and master
and defining the terms, capacity, wages, and duration of the voyage.2 3 Intended
primarily for the protection of seamen, 24 they have historically been con-
sidered as only an incident of the employment relationship rather than the
sole evidence of that relationship and all its terms. 25 No longer, moreover,
do periodic hiring and firing always accompany the signing of articles. So
frequent is reshipment that where the trips are short, as in the instant case,
the signing of articles may take place according to the period of wage payment
19. 49 STAT. 452 § 8(3), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (Supp. 1935). See 3 ANN. RE,, NLRB
(1938) 68 and cases cited; LIEN, LABOR LAW & RELATIONS (1938) § 46.
20. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 14-18, Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co. v. N. L. R. B.,
98 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938); Brief for Petitioner, pp. 35-36, Black Diamond
S. S. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 94 F. (2d) 875 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) ; petition for certliorari to
Supreme Court in the Black Diamond case, reported in (1938) 2 L. R. R. 77.
21. Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 98 F. (2d) 411, at 414, 415
(C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
22. Before their respective discharges on June 19 and June 21, the last shipping arti-
cles signed by the crew of the S. S. Cuba were on May 17 and of the S. S. Florida on
May 23. See In re Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co., 5 NLRB 959, at 967 (1938).
23. 17 STAT. 264 (1872), 46 U. S. C. § 564 (1934).
24. See Lent Traffic Co. v. Gould, 2 F. (2d) 554, 555 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924) ; The Occi-
dental, 101 Fed. 997, 998 (D. Wash. 1900) ; Johnson v. Rylander, 18 F. Stipp. 689 (N. D.
Cal. 1937).
25. Cf. Ravesies v. United States, 35 Fed. 917 (S. D. Ala. 1888). A seaman shipped
without the signing of articles is, notwithstanding, a member of the crew entitled to all the
benefits and subject to all the forfeitures, other than those involved in desertion, pre-
scribed by maritime law. Jameson v. The Regulus, 13 Fed. Cas. No. 7,198 (D. Pa, 1800)
(wages at rate prevailing in port of shipment); The Falco, 20 F. (2d) 362 (C. C. A.
2d, 1927) (recovery for injuries under the Jones Act) ; The Occidental, 101 Fed. 997
(D. Wash. 1900) (must perform services necessary to navigation of vessel): Jansen
v. The Theodor Heinrich, 13 Fed. Cas. No. 7,215 (E. D. Pa. 1838) (liability for damages
caused by quitting ship).
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and not according to voyages.2 6 Particularly is this true in the case of officers,
for they are usually treated as salaried employees, paid by the month, given
annual vacations and are considered by their employers to be in continuous
employment despite the signing of new articles.2-7 In the Black Diamond
case,2 8 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized these
actualities and refused to give the shipping articles any controlling effect on
the status of striking engineers who had been paid off at the end of the
voyage and replaced by engineers of another union. They were still employees
of the Company and hence the refusal to reinstate was discrimination under
the Act. Since in both these cases certiorari was denied by the Supreme
Court,2 9 the status of seamen under articles of agreement remains uncertain.
But the view in the P. & 0. case seems no more justified than pennitting the
employer in a mass production industry to refuse to continue hiring a work-
man because of union activity on the grounds that the employment is at will.
Furthermore, the shipping articles have been severely crticized as an archaism
of sailing ship days which promote the casual and transient character of
sailor's employment and lead to labor unrest." ' It is unfortunate that they
should now receive added emphasis as an implement to deprive seamen of the
benefits of general labor legislation.
Shipowners have attempted an additional escape from the charge of dis-
crimination by laying up the vessel, discharging all the seamen and then,
when the vessel fits out, rehiring only those belonging to the favored union.
The Board has found this to be only an excuse to justify discharge and has
ordered reinstatement of the men.3 For even where repairs are necessary,
it is customary to keep on hand a part of the crew to do shipside work, and
those who are laid off are notified when the ship is ready to resail. 2 In
many similar situations an employer has been held to the duty of offering
a return to work; where he closes down his plant 33 or moves his place of
business, 34 or where his workers are employed seasonally, or, like longshore-
26. In re Waterman S. S. Co., 7 NLRB ?37, 244 (1938). Since June 9. 1939, regu-
lations of the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation have permitted shipping arti-
cles for periods instead of voyages. See Kleiler, .M1arilime Labor Grous Up, 23 Scwavm
GRAPimc (Jan. 1939) 18, 20. For the practice on the Great Lakes, see Main, Labor Con-
ditions in Great Lakes Shipping (1937) 45 Mo. L.BOR REv. 269, 271.
27. Transcript of Record, p. 23, Black Diamond S. S. Co. v. X. L R. B. 94 F. (2d)
875 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); In re New York & Cuba Mail S. S. Co., 2 XLRB 595, 690
(1937); Note (1938) 2 L. R. R. 172.
28. Black Diamond S. S. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 94 F. (2d) 875 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
29. Black Diamond S. S. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 304 U. S. 579 (1938); N. L R. B. v.
Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co., 59 Sup. Ct. 248 (U. S. 1938).
30. U. S. MARITIME CoMMIssIoN, EcoNmuc SRTV" oF TiE AmEnic.%.x MEt'CHAiN
MAmx~E (Report to Congress, June 10, 1937) 49.
31. In re Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co., 5 NLRB 959, 964 (1938); In re
WNaterman S. S. Co., 7 NLRB 237, 244 (1938).
32. Ibid.
33. In re Cowell Portland Cement Co., C-390, 8 NLRB No. 126 (Sept. 6. 1933);
In re North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n, C-310, 10 NLRB No. 113 (Jan. 19, 1939);
In re Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 6 NLRB 325 (1938).
34. In re Kuehne Mfg. Co., 7 NLRB 304 (193S).
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men, only for a particular job.35 The lay-off itself is in the ordinary course
of business and non-discriminatory; but where the men continuously return
to work, the employer-employee relationship does not cease, and failure to
rehire because of union membership constitutes discrimination under the Act.
In the P. & 0. case, the court justified the failure to rehire by pointing to
the existence of the preferential hiring agreement with the favored union;
since no other bargaining agent had been designated, the company was con-
sidered obligated to give ISU men preference in reemployment.3, So long
as the employee status continued, however, the existence of the ISU contract
would seem immaterial since by its terms it only required preference in
employment to fill "vacancies" and even then it did not apply to reshipment 7
Furthermore, the pre-existing contract becomes all the more ineffective if
the majority of the employees no longer belong to the contracting union, since
under those circumstances, the Wagner Act permits the employer to bargain
exclusively with a clear majority.38 Although ostensibly the existence of a
contract with the one union shows that the employer is bargaining collectively,
it does not in the face of an inter-union dispute necessarily indicate bargaining
with the representative freely chosen by a majority of his employees. A
large part of his employees may have transferred to the other union or may
not have been in favor of the contract in the first place. The Board has
therefore decided that a pre-existing contract with one union is no bar to an
election and certification of the other union if a majority at the time of sign-
ing had been achieved by interference or coercion on the part of the employer
or had since shifted to the other union.39 Thus in the P. & 0. case, since
almost the entire crew on all the vessels of the company had transferred their
affiliation, 4° the company was not only no longer bound by the Contract with
the old union but could have safely bargained with the new union without
violating the Wagner Act. 41 After temporary lay-up and discharge, then, the
35. In re Alaska Packers Ass'n, 7 NLRB 141 (1938) (cannery workers); In re
United Fruit Co., 2 NLRB 896 (1937) (longshoremen); In re McCabe, Hamilton &
Renny, Ltd., 3 NLRB 547 (1937) (longshoremen); In re Standard Oil of N. J., R-828,
8 NLRB No. 115b (Sept. 15, 1938) (tank cleaners).
36. Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 98 F. (2d) 411, 415 (C. C. A.
5th, 1938).
37. Art. II, § 1 of the ISU agreement provided: "... as vacancies occur, members
of the ISU . . . shall be given preference of employment . . . ; provided, however, that
this section shall not be construed to require the discharge of any employee who may
not desire to join the union, or to apply to prompt reshipment, or absence due to illness
or accident." In re Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co., 5 NLRB 959, 968 (1938). For
similar provisions in other maritime agreements, see Art VI, § 1, Agreement between
Standard Oil Co. of N. J. and the NMU, Jan. 14, 1938, p. 7 (copy furnished by NMLU);
"Prompt reshipment," especially where loading and unloading takes a long time, has
frequently meant signing on a crew as many as 6 days after they were paid off. In re
Waterman S. S. Co., 7 NLRB 237, 247 (1938).
38. See (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1053, 1055.
39. See 3 A~x. REP. NLRB (1938) 134 ff. and cases cited; Comment (1938) 38
COL. L. REv. 1243; Rice, The Determination of Evnployee Representatives (1938) 5 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 188, at 194.
40. Only 20 out of about 170 men remained with the ISU. Brief for N.L.R.B, pp.
14, 24, Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co..v. N.L.R.B., 98 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
41. See It re The Texas Co., 7 NLRB 180 (1938); Rice, The Legal Significance of
Labor Contracts under the National Labor Relations Act (1939) 37 MIcH. L. REv. 693, 711.
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pre-existing contract seems only an instrument and part of an entire plan
to get rid of the newly affiliated groups ;- its use as a justification for refusing
to rehire the members of the rival union seems more like an attempt to avoid
the provisions of the Act than to submit to its obligations.
Irrespective of restrictions on his power to hire and fire, the maritime
employer is in a strategic position to exercise control over unionization by
means of threats and persuasion on the part of the ship's officers. Under the
Wagner Act, the employer is confined to strict impartiality in his conduct
towards two rival unions. Threats of discharge and less coercive methods of
influencing the men to join the favored union are an interference with the
employees' right to select representatives of their own choosing, and hence
an unfair labor practice for which the Board may issue a cease and desist
order or an order to withdraw recognition of the bargaining agent so selected.
The application of this part of the law has been extremely difficult where
supervisory employees carry on the interference or coercion and the employer,
or the management in case of a corporate employer, remains quiescent;44
particularly is this true where, as in the instant case, the supervisory employees
are members of an affiliated union and are fostering their own labor organ-
ization. In deciding these cases the Board has applied the doctrine of
respondeat superior; the employer must assume responsibility for the acts of
his supervisory employees even though he has not actually participated therein
and even though these acts are contrary to express instructions."z To protect
himself from an unfair practice charge, the employer must take affirmative
action to repudiate the conduct of his supervisory employees by notifying his
employees that he is neutral and that the unfair statements do not represent
the wishes of the company. 4" This view has been upheld in the courts47 with
the limitation that when the supervisory employees do not have the power to
The employer may nevertheless be subject to a decree of specific performance on behalf of
the old union. See (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 799; (1939) 4S Y.%LE L. J. 1063.
42. The Board's-findings of fact so indicated. On the S. S. Florida, the officers
offered the men the opportunity to stay on if they would change back to the ISU. On
the S. S. Cuba, although the ISU engine crew were staging the sit-down strike, only
NMU men were arrested and charged with wrongful possession; and although the entire
crew was paid off, the ISU men were permitted to sleep on board ship until the neit
morning when they were "rehired." In re Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co., 5 XLRB
959, 963-965 (1938); cf. Waterman S. S. Co., 7 XLRB 237, 249 (1938).
43. 49 STAT. 452 § 8(1), (2), 29 U. S. C. §158 (Supp. 1935). See 3 A.N.V. REP.
NTLRB (1938) 64 and cases cited.
44. See Lix-, L- OR LAW A.ND Ram TioNs (1938) § 64.
45. In re National Motor Bearing Co., 5 NLRB 409 (1938); In re 'Ward Baling
Co., C-492, 8 NLRB No. 57 (July 23, 1938) (supervisory employees fostering their
own labor organizations); In re Ingram M[fg. Co., 5 2' LRB 90S (1938) ; In re Semet-
Solvay Co., 7 NLRB 511 (1938).
46. It re M1. Lowenstein & Sons, 6 NLRB 216 (1938); In rc Montgomery Ward
& Co., 4 NLRB 1151 (1938).
47. N. L. R. B. v. Abell Co., 97 F. (2d) 951 (C. C. A. 4th, 193S); flallston.
Stillwater Knitting Co. v. N. L. R. B., 98 F. (2d) 758 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); Virginia
Ferry Co. v. N. L. R. B., 101 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).
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hire and discharge, their actions are not attributable to the employer unless
his knowledge of them is sufficient to amount to ratification of their conduct.
48
Despite these decisions, the court in the P. & 0. case condoned the ship's
officers' threats of discharge and persuasion to withdraw from the NMU as
merely "propaganda for their own unions, something in the nature of peaceful
picketing, which is protected by law."' 49 Whether or not such a view has any
validity in respect to ordinary employment conditions, it utterly ignores the
absolutism and omnipotence of officer authority on shipboard. With few
exceptions, the master has absolute control of hiring and firing of unlicensed
men on his vessel; and in most cases even this control is formal, the recom-
mendation of the mates as to the deck crew, the chief engineer as to the engine
crew, and the chief steward as to the employees in his department being vir-
tually conclusive. 0 To this control over the seamen's job must be added the
compulsion the officers can exercise by virtue of the fact that any disobedience
of their lawful commands subjects the seaman to loss of his wages,"' sus-
pension of his certificate by the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Naviga-
tion,5 2 or even to indictment for the crime of mutiny.63 Rather than being
mere supervisory employees, the officers of a vessel are virtually the manage-
ment of separate floating factories. This status was recognized in the Virginia
Ferry case.5 4 There the captain had organized the men on his ferry into
a union with himself as representative, and when a bona-fide union attempted
to organize he discouraged the men from joining. Although the captain in
this case had no power to hire and discharge, his position as the employer's
agent in navigation of the vessel and in command of the crew was sufficient
to hold the company responsible for his statements. This view should be
followed in the future, for the contrary language of the P. & 0. case virtually
deprives seamen of any protection against the unfair practices condemned
in the Wagner Act. Not only is the disfavored union left under the handicap
of organizing in the face of officer interference and coercion, but discharge
by the shore officials of the company will be no violation of the Act because
48. Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. N. L. R. B., 98 F. (2d) 758 (C. C, A. 2d,
1938). But see criticism of the hire-fire test in LIE,, LABOR LAW AND RELATIONS (1938)
237.
49. 98 F. (2d) 411, at 414 (1938).
50. Seamen find employment through five different conduits: (1) The union hall;
with the great majority of shipowners now under agreements, this is the principal outlet
on both coasts. (2) From the pierhead, especially in ports where no union halls exist.
(3) Through hiring halls operated by shipowners' associations which are now func-
tioning virtually only on the Great Lakes. (4) Through employment or personnel de-
partments maintained by only a few shipping companies. (5) Through the U. S. Ship-
ping Commissioner, who supplies all vessels operated by the U. S. Maritime Commission.
Except when hiring through his company's office, the master or engineer can always
reject any applicant he dislikes and call for another.
51. 17 STAT. 273 (1872), 46 U. S. C. § 701 (1934). Rothschild, supra note 3, at 1194.
52. 49 STAT. 1933 (1936), 46 U. S. C. A. §672 (Supp. 1938) ; 49 STAT. 1383 (1936),
46 U. S. C. A. § 239 (Supp. 1938). This punishment has been recently invoked il labor
disputes. See Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 21, 1939, p. 1, col. 8; N. Y. Times, Mar. 6,
p. 31, col. 2, and Mar. 10, 1939, p. 43, col. 2.
53. 35 STAT. 1146 (1909), 18 U. S. C. §§483, 484 (1934). See note 9, supra.
54. Virginia Ferry Co. v. N. L. R. B., 101 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).
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none of the discriminatory actions of the ship officers would be attributable
to the company,53 which is considered to be merely exercising its prerogative
under. the shipping articles. °
As in every maritime labor situation the real explanation for special treat-
ment springs from the necessity of maintaining discipline and safety at sea. 0
Despite the various technical arguments by which the court overruled the
Board's finding of discrimination, apparently its decision was ultimately based
not on the absence of discriminatory discharge but on the justifiability of
discriminatory discharge in the case of an inter-union dispute on shipboard
in order to maintain safety at sea.Y In fact, the court indicated that with
a dissentious crew it would have been gross negligence for the vessel to have
put to sea.5S If the conditions were such as to endanger the safety of the
vessel, passengers and crew,59 the court had good grounds for this conclusion.
A vessel manned by an incompetent crew is unseaworthyfi and the members
of the crew, although individually competent, may become incompetent gener-
ally by virtue of threats of sabotage, disobedience and quarrelsomeness. Since
presumably the alternatives of either persuading the Board to hold an election
or persuading one of the competing groups to petition for an election have
been unsuccessful,6 ' the real issue then becomes whether the employer can
correct this condition by discharging one group or whether he must lay up
his ships until the trouble can be straightened out ashore.
55. See concurring opinion of Sibley, J., Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co., 98 F.
(2d) 411, 416 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938). Cf. In re Memphis Furniture Mfg. Co., 3 XLRB
26 (1937), aff'd, 96 F. (2d) 1018 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938).
56. For a vigorous statement of this precept, see U. S. MAuRIME Co,1MISSluIN Sun-
ay, supra note 30, at 46. '
57. Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 93 F. (2d) 411, 415 (C. C. A.
5th, 1938).
58. Ibid.
59. In its findings of fact, the Board discusses testimony of the third mate and chief
engineer to the effect that the men did their work properly and that their attitude was
friendly. In re Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co., 5 NLRB 959, 967 (1938). Since the
entire crew on the S. S. Florida had shifted to the NMU, the Board also found that, as
to that vessel at least, inter-union strife could not have existed to endanger safety at sea.
Ibid.
60. Lord v. Goodall, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8506 (C. C. Cal. 1877); In re Meyer, 74
Fed. 881 (N. D. Cal. 1896); In re Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 130 Fed. 76 (C. C. A. 9th,
1904) ; The Rolph, 299 Fed. 52 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924), (1924) 22 Mier. L Rrv. 690. See
New Jersey S. S. Co. v. Brockett, 121 U. S. 637, 645 (1887) (common carrier has abso-
lute duty to protect passengers from misconduct of employees). Inter-union troubles
do not excuse liability for damages caused by delay in unloading. Continental Grain Co.
v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 22 F. Supp. 49 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
61. The employer might conclude a closed-shop contract with the newly affiliated
group, but only under great risks. If he guesses wrong as to the majority, he will have
to pay back wages to those discharged; he is also subject to strikes by the rejected
group or to a decree of specific performance under the old contract. See (1939) 48
YALE L J. 1059, 1063.
If employee-employer cooperation is possible, the best solution seems to be dual con-
tracts with each union for its members only, with exclusive recognition if and v.hen
either receives an NLRB certification. See (1939) 48 Y.a L. 3. 1053, 1056; Comment
(1938) 38 COL L. REv. 1243, at 1262.
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The court in the P. & 0. case never considered the alternative of laying
up the ships, so the conclusion was inevitable that the Wagner Act did not
go so far as to prevent discriimination at the expense of safety at sea. In a
similar situation on land, however, another Circuit has not only considered the
alternative of shutting down the plant but has decided that the Act required
this course rather than the discharge of one group, which under any cir-
cumstances would be a discrimination and violation of the Act. In NLRB
v. Star Publishing Company,62 workers in the circulation department shifted
from AFL to CIO affiliation. The AFL teamsters, who claimed jurisdiction
over all circulation employees, then refused to haul papers unless the circu-
lation employees either returned to the AFL or were fired and replaced by
AFL members. The company finally gave in and fired the CIO circulation
men. The court, in upholding the Board's order of reinstatement, decided
that it was no obstacle to enforcement that the plant would have to be shut
down. The Act gave no immunity to the employer because he thought the
exigencies of the moment required infraction of the statute. Moreover, al-
though the shutdown might burden interstate commerce, the Act was not
intended to protect commerce from all impediments but only from certain
unfair practices causing strikes which burdened commerce. Except for their
mutual recognition of the unfortunate position of the employer, the two cases
are probably irreconcilable. 63 But differences can be noted. By depriving
passengers, freight, and the mails of indispensable transportation, the laying
up of vessels affects a vital industry and may often have disastrous and far-
reaching results.64 Secondly, this very necessity of marine transportation
would tend to keep the ships moving despite inter-union conflict, and as a
practical matter rather than accept the certain loss involved in laying up the
vessels, a shipowner would attempt to maintain discipline and risk the possible
danger of sending out his vessels with dissentious crews. The situation would
then differ from that of any vital shore industry. Were violence to break out,
no police protection would be available.05 Neither the employer nor the union
headquarters would be in a position to direct the conduct of their men.00
And the lives and goods of the public would be subjected to hazards of which
62. 97 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
63. They were so considered in the argument before the Board in the 11f. & J. Tracy
Co. case involving the discharge of CIO boatmen because of threats of the ILA (AFL)
to tie up the company's operations. Notes (1938) 3 L. R. R. 77 and 356.
64. See N. Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1939, p. 3, col. 4 (Seattle ship strike cuts off Alaska's
food supply); N. Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1938, p. 4, col. 3 (tie-up of vessels causes food
shortage and shut-down of industries in Puerto Rico) ; HEARINGS Ox S. 3078 at 599 ff.
(Washington and Oregon fruit growers' losses due to sympathy strikes on west coast).
65. This is true even though the vessel is in the harbor, because acts done on board
a vessel are not breaches of the public peace. New York ex rel. Hansen v. Gabrielson,
1937 Am. Mar. Cas. 1138 (N. Y. 1937). See HEARNaS ox S. 3078 at 617.
66. The ship's delegates who carry all "beefs" to the officers have been manifestly
independent of union orders. See Klieler, supra note 26, at 19. In order to maintain dis-
cipline, maritime unions in Great Britain do not permit union representatives or shop
committees on board ships. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN
GREAT BRITAIN, U. S. Dept. of Labor (1938) Appendix A, p. 28. See HEARINGS ON S.
3078 at 779.
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they were unaware and could not escape. Thus, though harm to the employer
alone might not justify exception from the Act, where the harm necessarily
extends to the public both when the business is continued or when it is dis-
continued, discrimination to prevent that harm would be permissible.
The P. & 0. decision, however, depending as it does on the test of safety
at sea, leaves a very unsatisfactory procedure for the settlement of inter-
union shipboard difficulties. Must the ship make one "unseaworthy" trip
during which evidence may be collected to justify the discharge? Must the
shipowner always be subject to the risk of justifying before the Board its
officers' opinion that the crew was incompetent? Recognizing these diffi-
culties, the court said that only slight evidence was necessary to bring notice
to the officers and shipowner of possible danger.07 If this means that the
shipowners need not show factual danger but merely that their officers honestly
thought there was danger, then actual discrimination may easily take place
whenever two unions attempt to organize the same vessel. The organizing
of a militant union can be squelched and faith kept with the Act by dealing
with a quiescent union. On the other hand any other rule of proof would
force the employer to tolerate enough dissension to be able to prove danger
at sea to the satisfaction of the Board. In such event he would always be
subject to the risk of failure of proof and to having to pay back sizeable sums
in back wages to those discharged. 8
In the pre-certification stage of an inter-union dispute, then, the shipowner,
despite his willingness to bargain with the majority's choice, cannot obtain
a designation of that choice as bargaining agent. And he must submit in-
definitely to the pressures of both sidesG9 until discharge of one group becomes
justifiable either in order to maintain safety at sea or because one group has
committed an unlawful act under the doctrine of the Fansteel case." Rather
than requiring the employer to await such developments and thus subjecting
the disfavored group to discharge, an early determination of the bargaining
agent would appear to be a much better solution. It has been suggested that
the Act be amended specifically to give the employer the right to obtain a
Board designation.7 But rather than risk other unnecessary amendments,
67. Thus, threats of further sit-downs did not have to be actually uttered so long
as the officers believed they were made and acted on that belief in disdarging the crew.
Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 98 F. (2d) 411, 414 (C. C A. Sit,
1938). That the threat-makers were unidentified made the danger greater because at-
tributable to both unions. Id. at 415. An unlmown voice heard coming out of a venti-
lator was the sole evidence of "threats of sabotage." Brief for NLRB, p. 36, Peninsular
& Occidental S. S. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 98 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 5th, 193S).
68. At the time of the Board's order on March 15, 1938, tile back pay and mainte-
nance amounted to over $100,000. This increased at the rate of .350 a day during the
appeal. Brief of Petitioner, p. 90, Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co. v. X. L. R. B.,
98 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
69. See note 61, supra.
70. N. L. 1. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Co., 59 Sup. Ct. 490 (U. S. 1939). Cf.
Standard Lime & Stone Co. v. N.L.R.B., 97 F. (2d) 531 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) (com-
mission of a crime).
71. Proposed §9(c) of S. 1000, 76th Cong. 1st Sess. (1939), introduced by Senator
Walsh (Mass.) at the request of AFL officials. See N. Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1939, p. 1,
col. 3; Amendments to the Wagner Act (1939) 7 I. J. A. Buu.. 73, 96. Similar pro-
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the Board might more wisely change its own rules72 and rush an election
on the shipowner's petition. Not only would this avoid prolongation of un-
settled conditions in an industry that can little tolerate them, but because
of the two powerful unions already in the field it would not be open to the
objection that the employer could choose a time for election when a union
was weak.73
But the ordering of a Board election by no means resolves the difficulties
of inter-union rivalry on shipboard. In the first place, the conduct of the
election itself is fraught with trouble spots. 74 Since ship personnel change
so rapidly, in many instances the names of the employees on a given vessel
are not known sufficiently in advance of sailing time to permit a well-ordered
election prior to that time. Betveen voyages, employees may be in port for
only short periods. The procedure of the Board has been to post notice of
the election on each vessel of the company before it leaves its home port on
the first trip, if possible, next following the date of issuance of the Direction
of Election. 7 5 On the return of the vessel to the home port, the election is
usually conducted in the Shipping Commissioner's office by the Regional
Director as the men are paid off. Because of the length of time from the
granting of the election to the date of voting,70 the Board's election order
amounts to a signal to both unions to redouble their organizing and election-
eering efforts. Since the ship is the only practical place where the men can
be reached, the shipowner must issue passes in equal number to delegates
of both unions. 77 Again, because of the casual nature of maritime employ-
posals have been heretofore advocated for inter-union disputes in the shipping industry.
N. Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1938. p. 4, col. 5 (Guffey plan for mediation by N. L. R. B.);
HEARINCS Ox S. 3078, p. 437 (original Copeland Bill setting up the Maritime Labor
Board).
72. The Board permits only an employee or his representative to petition. N. L. PZ. B.
RULES AD REGULATIONS (Series I as amended, April 27, 1936) Art. III, § 1. B'ut
§ 9(c) of the act would seem to leave it within the Board's discretion. 49 StrA. 453, 29
U. S. C. § 159 (Supp. 1935). The New York Board permits petitions by the employer.
State Labor Relations Boards (1938) 7 I. J. A. BULL. 13, 19.
It is becoming the practice of the regional directors to assist the employer by getting
one of the rival unions to file a petition. Report of Regional Director for Second Rcqion
(1939) 4 L. R. R. 52, 54.
73. Amendments to the Wagner Act (1939) 7 I. J. A. BULL. 73, 96.
74. LIEN, LABOR LAW AND RELATIONS (1938) § 133; HEARINGS ON S. 3078, p. 872 if.
(Testimony by Director Herrick on the conduct of maritime elections in her district)
Comment (1938) 38 CoL L. REv. 1243, 1258.
75. Eligibility usually exists only for those who are employed at the date of petition
and who make the round trip and are still employed at the time of balloting; but, where
the trips are long, all those employed on the ship when posted and who are still em-
ployed at the time balloting takes place are eligible. in re Black Diamond S. S. Co.,
2 NLRB 241, 245 (1936); It re International 'Mercantile Marine Co., 2 NLRB 971,
975 (1937) ; In re American France Line, 3 NLRB 64, 72 (1937) ; In re International
Freighting Corp., 3 NLRB 692, 698 (1937). Rice, supra note 39, at 217, 218.
76. E.g., Lykes Brothers S. S. Co., 2 NLRB 102, 108 (1936) (vessels on 6 months'
voyages) ; see Rice, supra note 39, at 218.
77. To refuse passes to board ship is an unfair labor practice. in re Waterman S. S.
Co., 7 NLRB. 237 (1938) ; In re Seas Shipping Co., 4 NLRB 757 (1938) ; in re Amer-
ican France Line, 3 NLRB 64, 76 (1937).
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ment, the unlicensed personnel may change from the time of the election
order until the ship returns to the home port for posting of the notice, and
it may also change during the round trip prior to balloting. Care must be
taken that replacements are made known to the Board, for strong pressure
exists on the part of both employer and unions to pack the ships.78
A further point of friction exists in the selection of the appropriate bar-
gaining unit.79 Aside from the traditional distinction between officer and
crew, the organizational lines have varied frequently among the different
unions.8 0 This means that if the Board selects a unit including a class of
men which one union admits to membership, but which the other does not,
the former group will have a distinct advantage. Furthermore, the extent to
which the particular class of men will be included in the unit materially affects
the results of maritime elections. Because of the peculiar hiring system, the
Board has never considered a single vessel as a unit but always the entire
fleet of the shipowner, although two or more employers may act together
to the extent that the employees of both form the bargaining unit. 1 Thus
on single vessels or on all the vessels of one shipowner in an association, the
entire crews may possibly be members of the losing union; and where the
certified union demands a closed shop their dissatisfaction with the unpleasant
alternatives of signing up with the certified union or losing their jobs is
likely to be much greater than in the ordinary situation.P If the loser is
obstreperous, he may confront the enployer with further pressures, especially
since no appeal exists from the Board's decision on the appropriate unit or
the fairness of the election.83
78. HEARiGs oN S. 3078 p. 881; id. at 621 (employer fitting out vessel for one trip
prior to election) ; id. at 740 (picketing before election to force hiring of union men).
Double voting is prohibited. In re Associated Oil Co., 5 NLRB 893 (1938).
79. See Rice, The Determination of Employee Represcntati'es (1938) 5 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 188, 200; Stix, The Appropriate Bargaining Unit Under /ie 1|Wagner
Act (1938) 23 VAsH. U. L. Q. 156.
80. E.g., United Licensed Officers (Independent) includes all licensed officers, deck
and engine room; Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n (CIO) includes only licensed en-
gineers; Nat. Ass'n of Masters, Mates and Pilots (AFL) includes only licensed deck
officers; Int. Union of Operating Engineers (AFL) includes all marine engineers,
licensed or unlicensed; In re Grace Line, Inc., 2 NLRB 369 (1937). The Board has
generally considered as units radio operators, licensed deck officers, licensed engineers, un-
licensed personnel-including deck, engine, and stewards' departments, but not tugboat-
men or bargemen. See Rice, supra note 39, and cases cited.
81. In re International 'Mercantile Marine Co., 1 NLRB 384 (1936); In re Lykes
Bros. S. S. Co., 2 NLRB 102 (1936); In re Shipowners' Association of tie Pacific,
7 NLRB 1002 (1938).
82. E.g., the coastwise unit for west coast longshoremen has been tie source of
much trouble. Although the ILVU (CIO) was certified, the Tacoma longshoremen
remained AFL. As to them the CIO preferential hiring agreement was not enforced,
Note (1938) 3 L. R. R. 180; and more recently 2- shipping companies signed a separate
agreement with the AFL longshoremen covering Washington ports. AFL Weekly News
Serv., Jan. 14, 1939.
83. The regional directors usually file an intermediate report on the results of elec-
tions with 5 days leave for the losing union to file a protest. If the protest is rejected,
the decision becomes final. See 'Mrs. Herrick's testimony. HMAINGS oN S. 3078, p. S31.
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Though forced by law to bargain exclusively with the certified union, the
shipowner, as any other employer, may still be confronted with strikes,
picketing or boycotts by the losing union if he does."4 Due to his peculiar
position, however, his plight is not quite as sad as that of an ordinary em-
ployer. If members of the losing union refuse to leave the vessel, he can
get a possessory libel of his ship-an order issuing in admiralty that the ship
be turned over to its owner.8 5 Relief against picketing may be held barred
by the anti-injunction statutes ;86 but except where shoreside employees refuse
to pass the picket line to load or unload, picketing is not a serious menace,
for if the majority group supplies a crew the vessel can simply sail away.
As in any other inter-union dispute, the shipowner faces his most difficult
problem in the boycott.87 A typical situation arises when the vessel manned
on one coast with seamen belonging to the certified union sails to the port
of delivery on the other coast. There the longshoremen or the teamsters
may be of the same affiliation as the losing seamen's union and consequently
they may refuse to unload or carry the goods away.88 Although some recent
decisions have granted equitable relief despite the anti-injunction statutes,80
the shipowner, with the assistance of the consignee or owner of the cargo,
has an additional resource in the admiralty process. The libellant-consignee
will allege demand and refusal to deliver the cargo; the respondent shipowner
will make no defense; and the court will issue a possessory libel ordering the
United States Marshal to employ longshoremen and turn over the cargo to
the libellant on the dock.90 It has been of no avail for the union as inter-
venor or amicus curiae for respondents to claim that the consignees are not
Although no direct appeal is allowed, the way may now be open for review on this ques-
tion by an independent bill in equity, See A. F. of L. v. N. L. R. B., 4 L. R. R. 34 (App.
D. C. 1939) ; (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1053, 1058.
84. See HEARINGS oN S. 3078, p. 616; N. Y. Times, May 1, 1938, § III, p. 9, col. 3;
id., May 14, 1938, p. 31, col. 8; id., Jone 2, 1938, p. 45, col. 1; id., June 25, 1938, p. 29,
col. 1; 11 NEwswE.K (June 13, 1938) 34.
85. The Losmar, 20 F. Supp. 887 (D. Md. 1937); The Oakmar, 20 F. Supp. 650
(D. Md. 1937), (1938) 23 CoRN. L. Q. 302; cf. The Wind, 22 F. Supp. 883 (E. D. Pa.
1938) ; American Vest Africa Line v. West Irmo, 1937 Am. Mar. Cas. 1140 (E. D.
N. Y. 1937).
The Norris-LaGuardia Act evidently does not cover admiralty process. 47 STAT. 70
(1932), 29 U. S. C. § 104 (1934) ("no court of the United States shall have jurisdiction
to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction . . ."). An admir-
alty court is not a court of equity and has no power to issue injunctions. 1 BENEDICT,
ADMIRALTY (5th ed. 1925) 96. That an injunction may lie, however, see Mayo v. Dean,
82 F. (2d) 554 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936) (conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce
in violation of Sherman Act).
86.. See discussion of this question in (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1053.
87. See Comment (1938) 38 COL, L. REv. 1243, 1262.
88. See (1938) 2 L. R. R. 268; (1938) 3 L. R. R. 110; cf. N. Y. Times, Feb, 25,
1938, p. 37; col. 2; id., Mar. 17, 1938, p. 11, col. 2.
89. See cases cited in (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1053, 1056, n. 17.
90. Otis, McAllister & Co. v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 1937 Am. Mar.
Cas. 1092 (S. D. Cal. 1936) ; Luckenbach Gulf'S. S. Co. v. The Cargo in the S. S. North
Haven, 1935 Am. Mar. Cas. 1475 (E. D. La. 1935); Devendorf v. McCormick S. S. Co.,
1937 Am. Mar. Cas, 923 (Cal. 1937).
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the real parties in interest and that the action is fictitious and a fraud on the
court. 1 However, the remedy has definite limitations. Where the situation
becomes so tense that only violence would result from an attempt to carry
out the court order, the court will not force the marshal to unload without
assurance of financial and bodily protection.02 And if the teamsters refuse
to handle the cargo, the order may be denied since movement of goods from
dock to warehouse or other places ashore is beyond the admiralty court's
jurisdiction . 3
Even without such limitations, the entire use of the possessory libel for
these purposes has the undesirable effect of putting the court officers and
employees in the position of strikebreakers. In view of the tremendous loss
to the public resulting from tying up the shipping industry, legislation would
be desirable, once the Board has designated a bargaining agent, clarifying
the Wagner Act - Norris-LaGuardia Act combination so as to give the
shipowner a direct remedy against union activities compelling him to
bargain with other than the statutory agent. 4 But the problem is not so
simply solved. Maritime labor problems are deeply imbedded in the turbulent
history and complicated economics of the American shipping industry.05 The
shipowner, brought up on the discipline of the sea and facing foreign com-
petitors whose labor costs are far lower than his, has looked with little
tolerance upon attempts to unionize his ships. On the other hand, the sea-
man's long-fostered, bitter distrust of all employer and governmental activities,
his difficulty in maintaining continuous level-headed leadership of the sea-
men's unions, and the rude treatment and insecurity to which he has been
conditioned have not made him over-docile when he organizes to deal col-
lectively. More recently the government, with its subsidization of the merchant
marine, has interjected itself as a third party concerned with foreign trade
and national defense. Thus the impact of inter-union rivalry upon the shipping
industry has only accentuated the perennial problem of reconciling conflicting
interests. Various solutions have been sought in legislation regulating marl-
91. Otis, McAllister & Co. v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 1937 Am. Mar.
Cas. 1092, 1102 (S. D. Cal. 1936) ; Devendorf v. McCormick S. S. Co., 1937 Am. Mar.
Cas. 923, 924 (CaL 1937). Where the bill of lading releases the shipowner not only from
liability for damages but also from the obligation to deliver the cargo in case of a
strike, the suit may be fictitious since there would be no legal duty to deliver. Id. at 924.
92. Otis, McAllister & Company v. International 'Mercantile Marine Co., 1937 Am.
Miar. Cas. 1092, 1101 (S. D. Cal. 1936) (original order discharged because marshal
could obtain longshoremen only by coercion). See 5 I. J. A. Btu.L. 61 (1937).
93. Otis, McAllister & Company v. International 'Mercantile Marine Co., 1937 Am.
Mar. Cas. 1092, 1102 (S. D. Cal. 1936).
94. See Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence Upon the Development of
Collective Bargaining (1937) 50 HARv. L. RE%. 1071. 1107 (to the effect that since the
Wagner Act imposes a duty on the employer to bargain with the certified agent, activi-
ties to compel him to violate his legal duty would be held illegal and enjoinable). Cf.
(1939) 48 YAjx L. J. 1053.
95. See Hohman, supra note 1; 16 FORTUzE (Sept. 1937) (entire issue devoted to
shipping industry); Goodrich, Maritime Labor Treaties of 1936 (1937) 44 Mo. I.Au
REv. 349.
1939] NOTES 1081
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
time labor, but with only indifferent success. 0 Perhaps as the first stage
of the Wagner Act puts an end to the employer's union-fighting days, the
way may then open for the settlement of maritime labor disputes by special-
ized bodies like the Railway Labor Board, acting under arbitration princi-
ples. 97 Such a mature method, however, can only follow the dispersal of
inter-union troubles. Judicial and legislative measures directed towards this
end may to some degree protect the employer, but not without possible reac-
tionary consequences to the labor movement. Any lasting solution, as Great
Britain's experience shows,9s can really be achieved only by cooperation and
coordination among the rival unions. Labor at sea bears the competitive
burdens and the public responsibilities of a struggling shipping industry. It
cannot afford to see the gains of the last few years founder on public intoler-
ance of costly inter-union conflict.
THE ROLE OF THE CORPORATION IN LITIGATION CAUSED BY
FACTIONAL DISPUTES AMONG DIRECTORS *
FACTIONALISM£ within a corporation is ordinarily settled by the practical
device of majority rule. The will of the majority, within limits, is the will of
the corporation. A situation may arise, however, where no majority vote can be
marshalled, where directors or stockholders are divided, evenly and hopelessly,
on a controversial corporate matter. Immediate action by the management
may be necessary to preserve vital interests. Yet the power to act is vitiated
by the existing deadlock. Dictates of practical necessity may then be allowed
to override stricter considerations of agency, and authorization of a corporate
agent to sue be found where none in fact exists. A recent New Jersey case
affords striking illustration of one phase of this critical problem.
96. See ALBRECHT, supra note 1, c. III (discussion of hopes and failures under the
La Follette Seamen's Act of 1915) ; 52 STAT. 955, 965-969,.46 U. S. C. A. §§ 1126, 1131,
1251-1262 (Supp. 1938) [amendments to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936: (1) provid-
ing for a Maritime Labor Board to act as mediator in maritime labor disputes and to
submit by 1940 a plan for the establishment of a permanent federal policy as to maritime
labor disputes; (2) authorizing the U. S. Maritime Commission to train merchant marine
personnel, to establish wage and manning scales on vessels receiving operating-differ-
ential subsidies]. For other proposals, see N. Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1937, p. 7, col. 1; HEAR-
INGS ON S. 3078 (Copeland Bill for compulsory arbitration) ; N. Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1938,
p. 4, col. 5 (Guffey Bill for Mediation Board).
97. See Klieler, supra note 26 at 21; Garrison, The National Railuay Adjustinent
Board: A Unique Administrative Agency (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 567. The main objec-
tion to the Copeland Bill for applying the Railway Labor Board principles to the mar-
time industry was that it would hamper union organization. See N. Y. Times, Feb, 5,
1938, p. 31, col. 1 (testimony of Madame Perkins).
98. REPORT OF THE COM.MISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN (U.
S. Dept. of Labor, 1938) 8 (The three major unions have formulated comprehensive
rules for the conduct of organizing and shifts in membership).
*Elbum Holding Corp. v. Mintz, 120 N. J. Law 604, 1 A. (2d) 204 (1938).
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Stock in a realty corporation was owned equally by two factions, at odds
over corporate policy, each being represented by an equal number of directors
on the board. Nothing but an evenly divided vote upon controversial corpor-
ate matters could be secured. With this state of affairs obtaining, the
president of the organization brought suit in its behalf against the treasurer,
as an individual, to collect back rent on two leases, non-payment of which had
seriously interfered with the ability of the corporation to meet current obliga-
tions. Both president and treasurer were directors, but represented opposing
groups. No express authorization of the suit could be shown. The by-laws
did not provide for such action, but limited the power of tile president to that
of "a moderator at meetings of directors, of temporary chairman at those of
stockholders, and [duties] of a clerical nature in making reports and signing
papers." The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss was
affirmed. The appellate court held that the suit was properly instituted by
the president, on the ground that he had implied power to undertake, in the
face of deadlock on the board of directors, a suit necessary for the preserva-
tion of vital corporate interests, and to employ attorneys to effect that purpose.'
Under ordinary circumstances, in the absence of internal conflict, the presi-
dent of a business corporation has power to hire attorneys and to institute
or defend suits on its behalf. 2 No express authorization from the directors
is needed; the office of president is usually sufficient per se to raise a pre-
sumption of power to act,3 although the force of the presumption may be
strengthened by an appropriate statute4 or by the fact that the president is
also general manager.5 And authority may be found by implication in the
by-laws or in resolutions of the board of directors.0 Wherever found, the
power to sue or defend usually extends only to litigation incident to routine
business.- It does not, in most instances, permit the president to confess
1. Ibid.
2. 4 CooK, CORORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) §716; 9 FJ.urcnm, Conrcmvorjwos (Perm.
ed. 1931) §4216; 2 THOimPsoN, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 1543. A minority rule
denies the president such power. Ney Y. Eastern Iowa Tel. Co., 162 Iowa 525, 144 N. IN%
383 (1913); Ashuelot IMfg. Co. v. Marsh, 1 Cush. 507 (Mass. 1848); see Campbell v.
Hanford, 67 Cal. App. 155, 162, 227 Pac. 234, 237 (1924).
3. 9 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1931) § 4216; 2 Tno. ssoN., CoarmoArzo':s
(3d ed. 1927) § 1543. The president of a banking corporation, by virtue of his office, is
usually granted such power. Notes (1919) 1 A. L. R. 693, 704, (1930) 67 A. L. R. 970,
978. But cf. Pacific Bank v. Stone, 121 Cal. 202, 53 Pac. 634 (1S93).
4. LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1932) § 1115(7). The power to sue thus granted
is revocable by express action of the directors. St. Bernard Trappers' Ass'n, Inc. v.
Michel, 162 La. 366, 110 So. 617 (1926).
5. Blue Goose Mining Co. v. Northern Light 'ining Co., 245 Fed. 727 (C. C. A.
9th, 1917) ; Trustees of Smith Charities v. Connolly, 157 Mass. 272, 31 E. 1 058 (1892);
see Colman v. ,Vest Va. Oil & Oil Land Co., 25 V. Va. 118, 169 (1M).
6. Argue v. 'Monte Regio Corp., 115 Cal. App. 575, 2 P. (2d) 54 (1931); Hart
Land & Improvement Co. v. Odd Fellows Hall Ass'n, 142 La. 487, 77 So. 125 (1917);
cf. Traxler v. Minneapolis Cedar & Lumber Co., 128 -Minn. 295, 150 N. N\. 914 (1915).
7. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (1930) § 109; Comment (1937) 23 WAsu. U. L Q.
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judgment against the corporation 8 or file voluntary petitions in bankruptcy
in its behalf. 9 These acts, unusual in nature, transcend the scope of the agent's
implied authority.
But the relatively rare state of deadlock among directors raises problems
of authorization and agency different from those presented in the usual situa-
tion. Deadlock existing, the president has been permitted to sue and defend
in behalf of the corporation where the need for action to preserve vital cor-
porate interests was urgent. 10 The principal case goes farther, however, than
other cases of its kind in permitting the president to institute proceedings
where no implied authorization at all for such action could be found in previous
resolutions of the board1 and where the suit was not brought against the
corporation by an outside party.12 Applied to the present situation, traditional
rules of agency, ordinarily relevant to the power of the president to sue,
appear to break down; for the very existence of the impasse would seem to
be notice to the world that the president does not have implied authority to
act for the corporation.' 3 It may be contended that the effect of the deadlock
is the cancellation of one opposing faction against the other, with the result
that the president is left with what he had before-an implied authority to
sue. But the decided cases have not employed this theory. Principles of agency
have in effect been disregarded, and practical necessity has dictated the rule
that the president, as chief officer of a going concern may, even in the face
of deadlock, take steps to protect corporate interests where immediate and
vital injury threatens.14 The fact that a crisis is at hand-the risk of default
8. 3 Tnoampsox, CORPOArIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 1596; Bruch v. National Guarantee
Credit Corp., 13 Del. Ch. 180, 116 Atl. 738 (1922) ; Raub v. Blairstown Creamery Ass'n,
56 N. J. Law 262, 28 At. 384 (1893). In Illinois the confession is prina facie valid.
Snyder Bros. v. Bailey, 165 Ill. 447, 46 N. E. 452 (1896); State Bank of East Moline
v. Moline Pressed Steel Co., 283 I1. 581, 119 N. E. 604 (1918).
9. It re Community Book Co., Inc., 10 F. (2d) 616 (D. Minn. 1926); see 9
FLmrcIIER, CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1931) § 4216. But cf. It re Farrell Realty Co.,
10 F. (2d) 612 (W. D. Pa. 1925).
10. Regal Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Merlis, 274 Fed. 915 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921)
(president permitted to file answer to petition for involuntary bankruptcy); Lydia E.
Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 9 N. E. (2d) 573 (Mass. 1937) (suit by president to
enjoin certain directors from spending excessive sums on advertising and borrowing
money at high rates of interest held maintainable) ; cf. Gottlieb v. Avery Realty Co., Ltd.,
182 La. 703, 162 So. 571 (1935); Recamier Mfg. Co. v. Seymour, 15 Daly 245, 5 N. Y.
Supp. 648 (1889).
11. In Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 9 N. E. (2d) 573 (Mass. 1937),
cited supra note 10, the board of directors had previously passed a special resolution
giving the president general charge of the business and the court therein found some
implied authorization for the suit.
12. In the absence of authorization by the directors, the president generally has more
power to authorize the defense of suits brought against the corporation than the insti-
tution of actions in behalf of the corporation against outside parties. 2 FLErrcIlE, C0m1-
PoRATioNs (Perm. ed. 1931) § 618; cf. Beebe v. Beebe Co., 64 N. J. Law 497, 46 Atl. 168
(1900).
13. See 1 MEcHE.m, LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §§ 616, 708, 790.
14. See note 10, supra. The principal case adopts similar reasoning.
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judgment unless an answer be filed or the running of a statute of limitations
-is probably the basis for his power.
Analogies may be adduced to justify the result which courts have reached.
A partner in a dual partnership, over the express refusal of the other partner,
may sue on behalf of the partnership to enforce an existing claim. 15 The
action of either partner within the scope of the business is for tis purpose
viewed as the action of both.16 More persuasive justification may perhaps be
found in the basis of the ordinary stockholders suit.Y7 The thesis may be
stated as follows: the president of this corporation was one of its stockholders.
A stockholder ordinarily may bring an action on behalf of his corporation
to enforce a claim clearly due the organization which the board of directors,
where refusal is not a matter of business discretion, refuse to enforce them-
selves.18 Demand on the directors to bring the action, a condition precedent
to suit, is excusable where demand obviously would be unavailing.', The
impasse in the present case plainly revealed both the futility of any demand
and the fact that no express authorization of any action was forthcoming from
the directors.2 ) The president, therefore, was merely employing a more
direct method to accomplish a result which could otherwise have been reached
through a derivative action.
The principal case was treated by the court as involving only the issue of
the power of the president to sue when the board of directors was dead-
locked.2 1 A similar view has been taken elsewhere.2 2 Actually the decision
raises further implications. Since the president of the plaintiff corporation
was also a director, as was the defendant treasurer, the ramifications of the
suit may be carried beyond the office of the presidency alone, and the issue
changed from that of the power of the president to sue to that of the power
of a given group of directors to dictate the course of corporate litigation. The
principal case may be restated: where the directors of a company are evenly
divided over a controversial corporate matter, that faction which has control
of the presidency may sue an outside party or a director in the other faction
on behalf of the company, and hire attorneys for that purpose, when the
need for legal action is urgent and the litigation would inure to the organiza-
tion's benefit. Moreover, logically it would seem to follow that the opposing
15. Hill v. Mfarsh, 46 Ind. 218 (1874); Coggeshall v. McKenny, 114 S. C. 1, 103
S. E. 30 (1920).
16. Ibid. See CAN, P.m'ia-TuHirp (1938) § 53, p. 223.
17. Since the power of the stockholder to charge to the corporation the expenses of
his litigation depends generally on some direct benefit accruing therefrom to the corpora-
tion, the force of the analogy would break down in the instant case were the president
unsuccessful in the prosecution of the suit for rent. See 13 FLrcn, oGrozarwo'm s
(Perm. ed. 1931) § 6045. But the court appeared to regard the right to recover as clear.
18. Bergman Clay Mfg. Co. v. Bergman, 73 Wash. 144, 131 Pac. 485 (1913); see
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 319 (1936); Comment (1936)
45 YALE L. J. 649, 665-666.
19. 13 Fxzrc--a, CoRPoAo'ioxs (Perm. ed. 1931) § 6008.
20. In Regal Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. .Merlis, 274 Fed. 915 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
deadlock among the directors was held to excuse the president from the formality of
making express demand that action be taken.
21. Elblum Holding Corp. v. Mintz, 120 N. J. Law 604, 1 A. (2d) 204 (1938).
22. (1938) 52 HAzv. L. REv. 321.
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directors, not in control of the presidency, have no power to curb the dominant
group, even though the opposition is motivated by a genuine desire to serve the
corporate interests. Practically, the force of the logic probably breaks down,
for in each of the cases involving deadlock the defending group was motivated
by interests, if not adverse to, at least hardly best attuned to those of the
corporation.23 It is by no means clear that the actions would have been main-
tainable, had the deadlock been the result of an honest difference over funda-
mental corporate policy.
Realistically, the present suit may be regarded as a purely intracorporate
affair between two contesting factions of directors, one led by the president
of the corporation, the other by the defendant treasurer.24 The corporation
is thus no longer an active protagonist asserting an alleged cause of action
against an outside party; it instead adopts a relatively passive role and stands
by while parties within the corporate body settle a legal dispute. Under such
an interpretation, the issue presented is not whether the action has been
properly authorized by the corporation, since it does not really matter whether
the corporation is a party at all, but whether it should be subjected to the
expenses of the litigation incurred by the respective parties, on the ground
that the organization should bear the costs of intracorporate suits.
In general, the dominant group of directors-the majority-has the power,
insofar as suits with outside parties go, to authorize litigation in behalf of
the corporation and bind it for the costs.2 5 But this power extends only to
litigation germane to the best interests of the corporation or which the direc-
tors reasonably believe necessary for the preservation of those interests.2 0
The fact that the litigation may prove unsuccessful and thus bring no benefit
to the organization does not excuse it from paying the costs of suit. Where,
however, litigation develops between parties within the corporation itself who
attempt to saddle it with the expenses which they have incurred, courts, faced
with the problem of allocation, have adopted a different determinant. 7 Benefit
23. In the principal case defendant treasurer and director was personally indebted
to the plaintiff corporation for the very rent sought to be collected. In Lydia H. Pinkham
Medicine Co. v. Gove, 9 N. E. (2d) 573 (Mass. 1937), there was evidence of fraud and
misconduct on the part of the opposing faction of directors. In Regal Cleaners & Dyers,
Inc. v. Merlis, 274 Fed. 915 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921), the opposing directors were creditors
of the corporation and the court appeared to regard their refusal to authorize defense to
the bankruptcy petition as not in the corporation's best interest. And cf. Recamier Mfg.
Co. v. Seymour, 15 Daly 245, 5 N. Y. Supp. 648 (1889).
24. The action was brought against defendant in his individual capacity, but practi-
cally, little distinction can be drawn between defendant's refusal as an individual to pay
rent to the corporation and his refusal, as a director, to authorize the institution of pro-
ceedings against himself, as an individual, to collect that rent.
25. 2 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1931) § 535; 2 TnOmPsoN. CoRonvRzoNS
(3d ed. 1927) § 1282.
26. General Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Guaranty Mortgage & Securities Corp., 264
Mass. 253, 162 N. E. 319 (1928) ; O'Malley v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 121 S. W.
(2d) 834 (Mo. 1938); Hall v, Vunk, 248 App. Div. 900, 290 N. Y. Supp, 647 (2d
Dep't 1936).
27. Hagerstown Furniture Co. v. Baker, 158 Md. 574, 149 Ati. 556 (1930) : General
Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Guaranty Mortgage & Securities Corp., 264 Masq. 253,
162 N. E. 319 (1928) ; cf. Kernaghan v. Williams, L. R. 6 Eq. 228 (1868).
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to the company becomes the guiding factor; the latter is not liable for the
costs of purely factional contests between its members from which it derives
no real advantage28 Directors cannot, for example, bind the corporation to
pay the expenses of libel proceedings brought by them against certain stock-
holders, when the sole purpose of the suit is to silence a dissentient minority.
A different outcome may be anticipated when direct gain accrues to the
company as the result of the internal contest. Benefit to the company then
outweighs the burden of partisan maneuvering. The plaintiff faction of direc-
tors in the instant case were able to charge necessary attorneys' fees to the
corporation, because collection of the rent claim would directly benefit the
corporation; presumably, however, the defending faction could make no such
charge. Even were the latter successful in defense, its power to subject tie
corporation to the expenses of the suit may be doubted, since the corporation
would gain no benefit from failure to collect the rent. Directors cannot charge
to the corporation the costs of defending an action brought against them by
stockholders for alleged misappropriation of corporate funds, even when they
are successful in the defense, because the organization receives no advantage
from such a dispute.30 Yet a number of English and Amnerican cases have per-
mitted directors, whose policies were being criticized by certain stodkolders
as part of a campaign to elect new directors at an approaching meeting, to
charge the corporation with the costs of sending to all stockholders stamped
returnable proxies and advertising matter which urged the stockholders to
re-elect the incumbent directors and defended the policies pursued?31 The
cost of preceedings instituted to review the subsequent election of these direc-
tors was also chargeable to the corporation 2 The duty of the organization
to bear these expenses was predicated on the assumption that it received a
benefit in having its stockholders fully advised as to the policies which the
directors were pursuing. The fact that the directors, in defending their policies
before the stockholders, were also seeking incidentally to maintain themselves
in power did not for that reason change the action from a corporate to a
factional affair.m Carried over to the province of intracorporate litigation,
a group of directors would seem to have the power to undertake litigation
tending to further their own control over the corporation and to charge the
costs thereto when, in addition, the organization received direct advantage.3
28. Ibid.
29. Pickering v. Stephenson, L. R. 14 Eq. 322 (1872); cf. Studdcrt v. Grsvenr,
33 Ch. D. 528 (1886).
30. Griesse v. Lang, 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N. E. 2- (1931); Jesse v. Fnur-Whcel
Drive Auto Co., 177 Wis. 627, 189 N. V. 276 (1922).
31. Rascover v. American Linseed Co., 135 Fed. 341 (C. C. A. 2d. 19105); Hall v.
Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. CI. 78, 171 Ati. 226 (1934) ; Lawyers'
Advertising Co. %. Consolidated Ry. Lighting & Refrigerating Co.. 187 N. 1. 395, 80
N. E. 199 (1907) ; Peel v. London & N. AV. Ry., 1 Ch. D. 5 (1907).
32. Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Pictures Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 At. 224
(1934).
33. See Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Pictures Screen Curp.. 20 Del. Ch. 78, 85,
171 At. 226, 229 (1934) ; Peel v. London & N. AV. Ry., 1 Ch. D. 5. 21 (1907).
34. Cf. Gottlieb v. Avery Realty Co.. Ltd., 182 La. 703, 162 So. 571 (1935) ; Lydia
E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 9 N. E. (2d) 573 (Mass. 1937); Rccamier Mffg. Co.
v. Seymour, 15 Daly 245, 5 N. Y. Supp. 648 (1889).
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And conversely, they may perhaps have the power to bill the corporation for
the cost of defending factional suits brought against them, when a successful
defense could be shown to bring the corporation material benefit. 85 But in-
cidental benefit is not enough; the fact that the suit settles a point of con-
troversy among the corporate members, restoring harmony to the ranks,
may in reality be advantageous to the company, but it is not sufficient to render
it liable for the costs.8 6
Analogous situations lend support to the principle that the corporation,
when benefited, must pay. A stockholder who successfully maintains a suit
by which his corporation is enriched by property or money recovered may
have attorney's fees paid out of such property or funds.37 The beneficiary of
a trust fund who brings suit against the trustee and thereby preserves or
increases the fund may charge his attorney's fees to the trust fund, on the
equitable principle that a fund which has been protected by the services of
an attorney should bear the burden of those services. 8
The principal case fits into the rubric. Collection of the rent claim by the
pursuing faction of directors would bring direct gain to the plaintiff corpora-
tion. Whether the suit be regarded as a corporate action, properly authorized,
against an outside party, or an intracorporate factional dispute, with due
benefit to the corporation, the latter is liable for the costs of the proceeding.
Conceivably, the duty of the corporation to meet the expenses of the action
might be excused by failure to collect the rent; but actually the issue is
virtually moot, since courts appear to allow the president to sue under such
circumstances only where the right to recover is undoubted. 0 In the last
analysis, the decision in the instant case is practical. Creditors and stock-
holders are protected from eventual disability to collect at all. Where so
desirable a result is so clearly indicated, courts will probably not be much
concerned with abstract principles of agency or the devious strategems of
factions contending for corporate control.
35. Suppose directors of a corporation, who have embarked upon a course of business
marking a radical departure from traditional corporate policy, are sued by a stockholder
for mismanagement. They defend successfully and can show the change in policy has
proved of substantial benefit to the corporation. The expense of defense might then be
chargeable to the corporation.
36. General Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Guaranty Mortgage & Securities Corp.,
264 Mass. 253, 162 N. E. 319 (1928) ; Griesse v. Lang, 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N. E. 222
(1931); Jesse v. Four-Wheel Drive Auto Co., 177 Wis. 627, 189 N. W. 276 (1922).
37. Carbon Steel Co. v. Slayback, 31 F. (2d) 702 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929) ; Marlin v.
Marsh & Marsh, 189 Ark. 1157, 76 S. W. (2d) 965 (1934) ; cf. Clarke v. Hot Springs
Electric L. & P. Co., 76 F. (2d) 918 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935), cert. dcnukd, 296 U. S. 624
(1935) (bondholder's suit).
38. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527 (1881) ; United States v. Equitable Trust
Co., 283 U. S. 738 (1931) ; cf. Ex parte McLendon, 212 Ala. 403, 102 So. 696 (1925) ;
Drain v. Wilson, 117 Wash. 34, 200 Pac. 581 (1921) (successful litigation benefiting
decedents' estates).
39. See note 10, supra.
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A POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF THE SCOPE OF THE PATENT
MONOPOLY*
VAmIous methods have in the past been used to retain control over the
patented article after it has passed from the possession of the patentee. A
rough classification would include the license, the agency device, and the mere
exercise of the vendor's right to refuse to sell to those who do not abide by
his policies. The first two are dependent on the scope of the patent monopoly;
the third is a long-recognized common-law privilege of the vendor. These
devices have achieved varying degrees of success, as courts from time to time
have placed them upon either side of the thin line separating controls which
are legitimate corollaries of the monopoly conferred by Congress from
restraints which would enable the patentee to achieve the unlawful donina-
tion of an entire industry.
The general method of retaining control by means of a license has taken
two forms. The first contemplates a direct contract with purchaser and sub-
purchaser, while the second involves a restrictive notice attached to the article
itself. It was early decided that under the license contract the patentee could
lawfully restrict his license to make, use or vend' generally upon his own
terms, but that after sale by the licensee the patentee lost control over the
article, and the purchaser had absolute dominion.2 Once it had been estab-
lished that an article purchased from the licensee was beyond the scope of
the patent monopoly, an extension of the license contract device was naturally
attempted. The logical step was taken by providing as a condition of the
license to make and sell that sales should be made only to licensed jobbers.3
The jobbers, of course, were granted licenses only if they agreed to maintain
the resale prices established by the patentee. A further variation was later
undertaken by reserving to the patentee rights to a royalty from each resale,
thus ostensibly continuing his interest in the product after it had passed
from his hands.4 Both methods, however, were held to violate the Sherman
*United States v. Ethyl Gasoline Corporation (decision pending in the District
Court for the Southern District of New York).
1. Restrictions on the licensee's right to manufacture: Rubber Co. v. Goodyear,
9 Wall. 788 (U. S. 1869) (place); Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70 (1902)
(type of product) ; Aspinwall Mfg. Co. v. Gill, 32 Fed. 697 (C. C. D. N. J. 1887) (quan-
tity). Restrictions on the right to use: Mitchell v. Hawley, 16 WVail. 544 (U. S. 1873)
(time limit); Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788 (U.S. 1869) (place). Restrictions
on the right to vend: United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476 (1926) (to
specified vendees at prices fixed by licensor); Straight Side Basket Co. v. Webster
Basket Co., 4 F. Supp. 644 (XV. D. N. Y. 1933) (at price fixed by licensor).
See generally, McCormack, Restrictive Patent Licenses and Restraint of Trade
(1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 742, 759; Feuer, The Patent Monopoly and the Anti-Trust Laws
(1938) 38 Cor. L. REv. 1145, 1155.
2. Adams v. Burke, 17 Wall. 453 (U. S. 1873); Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed
Co., 157 U. S. 659 (1895) ; Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1 (1913) ; see ELLIs, PATENT
AsSIGNIEENTS AND Lxcn.ss (1936) § 242.
3. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20 (1912).
4. United States v. Schrader's Sons, Inc., 252 U. S. 85 (1920). It may be argued
that the decision in both this and the Standard Sanitary case (note 3, supra) , were placed
upon the general grounds of there being an illegal combination of manufacturers, and
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Act, for the devices were said to accomplish more than was necessary to
protect the use of the patent or its monopoly. A similar fate has been shared
by attempts to attach to the article itself a notice of the restrictive terms of
the license. Whether a notice is affixed or not, courts have been willing to
resolve the problem according to the "witty diversities of the law of sales," 
and uniformly hold that title passes when the patentee receives full con-
sideration for his product. Therefore, since the transaction is a complete
sale and not a license, the vendor retains no rights in the product.0
The second general type of restrictive device, that of making intermediate
vendors agents of the patentee, has received more gentle treatment. Such a
method of control has been upheld on the theory that the owner of an
article may dispose of it directly to the public, and thus fix the price by which
his agents transfer title from owner to consumer.7 It may be noted in passing,
however, that this method depends upon rigid compliance with the formalities
of the agency concept for its effectiveness and, further, that the device has
been upheld on principles of general, rather than patent law. 8
The third method-the exercise of the right to refuse to sell-is a part of
the general body of the law, not dependent for its validity upon the scope of
the patent monopoly. It is therefore more vulnerable to attacks based on the
anti-trust statutes.) The action of the original owner in refusing to sell mnust
that therefore the jobber license requirements were not specifically prohibited by the
court. However, even taking this approach, if there has been at least one complete
sale, either from patentee to purchaser or from licensee to purchaser, the rule of Bauter
v. O'Donnell, (note 2, supra), applies, and the resale restriction on the purchaser is thus
invalid.
S. Mr. Justice Holmes, in Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507, 512 (1906).
6. Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1 (1913); Straus v. Victor Talking Match. Co.,
243 U. S. 490 (1917). Final disposition of this technique seems to have been made in
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502 (1917), in which
the court held that statutes relating to patents did not provide for such a license notice,
and that "whatever validity it has must be derived from the general and not from the
patent law."
7. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476 (1926). Two questions
were raised in this case: (1) Could a patentee, by maintaining the formalities of an
agency relationship, control the price at which retailers sold his product? (2) Could a
patentee license another to manufacture his product and sell to persons designated and
at prices specified by the licensor? Both questions were decided in favor of the patentee,
as against the Government's contention that the practices were in violation of the anti-
trust laws.
8. "The owner of an article, patented or otherwise, is not violating the common law,
or the anti-trust law, by seeking to dispose of his article directly to the consumer and
fixing the price by which his agents transfer the title from him directly to the con-
sumer." United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476, 488 (1926) (italics added).
Thus it would appear that the fact that the General Electric Co.s product was patented
was not a determinative factor in the court's decision.
9. This is true, of course, only if it be assumed that there is a basic conflict between
the patent monopoly and the anti-trust laws. Such would appear to be the assumption
on which the parties in the instant case have proceeded. But it has been ably argued
that there is no such conflict, that statements to that effect are only dicta, and that in
every case in which a patentee has been upheld as against an attack based on the anti-
be wholly negative in character, for any affirmative steps in enforcing coopera-
tion,10 or in ferreting out and blacklisting those of his distributors who are
neglecting to maintain his policies"l will very possibly be branded as "restraint
of trade" or "unfair competition." Except for "Fair Trade" laws, express
contracts are of course beyond the pale, and courts will readily imply an
illegal agreement or combination "from a course of dealing or other cir-
cumstances."' 2 On the other hand, the Sherman Act does not prevent a
manufacturer from announcing in advance the prices at which his goods may
be resold, and refusing to deal with those who did not conform to such
prices.13 Thus it would seem that as long as the manufacturer makes no
effort to compel cooperation from his distributors in the maintenance of his
policies, and does not use obvious methods to investigate or penalize those
who fail to fall in line,14 his actions in selecting his customers are free from
the taint of the anti-trust laws.
An interesting combination of the various devices outlined above has been
revealed in a pending suit brought by the United States to enjoin the Ethyl
Gasoline Corporation from alleged violations of the Sherman Act.1 The
defendant company is the owner of several patents relating to a motor fuel
combining gasoline and tetra-ethyl lead,16 and it has licensed practically all
the refiners of gasoline in the country to manufacture and sell the patented
trust laws, his patents have had no controlling effect in the decision. See United Shoe
Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U. S. 451, 463 (1922) ; Blount Mfg. Co. v. Yale
& Towne Mlfg. Co., 166 Fed. 555, 561 (C. C. D. Mass. 1909); Gt.,L'L', PsL.rt:nrs
OF TRaE iN PATEaTED Aricr.Es (1910) 289, 290. See note 8, supra.
10. Shakespeare Co. Y. Federal Trade Commission, 50 F. (2d) 758 (C. C. A. 6th,
1931) (defendant refused orders except on assurance that customer would refrain from
price cutting).
11. Cream of Wheat Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 14 F. (2d) 40 (C. C. A.
8th, 1926) (information solicited from customers) ; Hills Bros. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, 9 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926) (information secured by salesmen and other
retail dealers). But cf. Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U. S. 203 (1921).
12. Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U. S. 208, 210 (1921).
13. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300 (1919).
14. In Federal Trade Commission v. Beechnut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441 (1922)
the investigation as to the identity of price cutters by special agents of te defendant
and by loyal dealers was held to be in restraint of trade, as was "any equivalent coopera-
tive means of accomplishing the maintenance of prices fixed by the company."
15. United States v. Ethyl Gasoline Corporation (decision pending in the District
Court for the Southern District of New York).
16. The Government infers that the defendant corporation's patents really embrace
only the Ethyl fluid and that any restrictions imposed on the combination of fluid and
gasoline are therefore not justified. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 53-55, United States v.
Ethyl Gasoline Corporation. In view of the stipulation that the patents cover the fluid,
the combination, and the method of burning of the combination in gasoline engines,
[Stipulation, pp. 3-4, United States v. Ethyl Gasoline Corporation] this conclusion seems
erroneous. Vhile therefore not particularly relevant to the issues of the instant case,
the Government by its contention indirectly raises the question of whether the validity
of a patent may be tested, and if found wanting annulled, in a suit arising under the
Sherman Act. For an interesting discussion of this point, see Feuer, supra note 1, at
1175.
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product.17 While the refiner licensees may sell directly to the public through
their own retail outlets, or to independent retailers, it is a condition of their
license that other sales may be made only to such jobbers as have received
licenses from the defendant corporation.' s When an application for a license
is made by a jobber, he is investigated by one of the defendant corporation's
field representatives, who have nearly complete discretion in the determination
of whether or not a license should be granted.1 After issuance of a license,
these investigations are continued. 20 Since approximately seventy per cent
of all gasoline sold in the United States is treated with the Ethyl fluid,-1 and
since through its licensing system the defendant has complete control as to
who shall sell lead-treated gasoline, the Government contends that this tre-
mendous power is a violation of the Sherman Act in that it has been used
to restrain trade through the maintenance of the resale prices and policies
of the defendant corporation's refiner licensees. An injunction against con-
tinuance of the jobber licensing system is therefore being sought. Specifically,
the petitioner attacks first those provisions of Ethyl Corporation's refiner
licenses which require that sales be made only to licensed jobbers,- and
second, the selection and supervision of jobber licenses.23 The Ethyl Cor-
poration defends its system on the two-fold ground that, because of its patents,
its licensing systeri is justified,24 and that under this system it is merely
exercising the common-law right to refuse to sell.25 The issue is thus squarely
presented as to whether or not the method of distribution in question is
justified by the scope of the patent monopoly, and if not, whether the anti-
trust laws are being violated.
A consideration of this marketing arrangement in the light of the devices
and techniques that have received judicial scrutiny in the past renders it
obvious that neither the agency nor the license notice device would be effective
in this situation. Both the tremendous size of the business involved and the
nature of the product itself would preclude their application.20 But the
license contract device and the right to refuse to sell remain, and the two
have been used with admirable ingenuity in the instant case. The patentee
17. Stipulation, p. 10, United States v. Ethyl Gasoline Corporation.
18. Ibid.
19. Id. at 18.
20. Id. at 20.
21. Id. at 10.
22. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 2, 49 el seq., United States v. Ethyl Gasoline Corporation.
23. Id. at 25 et seq.
24. Brief for Defendant, p. 42 et seq., United States v. Ethyl Gasoline Corporation.
25. Id. at 57 et seq.
26. The notice device has, of course, been proven ineffective. See note 6, supjra.
The agency device would be impractical because the retail gasoline business was, at
the time Ethyl was introduced, and still is, in a chaotic state. Wild-cat stations are still
springing up at every crossroad. See Till, Gasoline, in HAMILTON AND AssociArq,
PRICE AND PRICE POLICIES (1938) 117, 124. Even if a method could be devised by which
daily retail sales could be accurately calculated, the constant turn-over of stations would
render the agency method of distribution extremely hazardous, particularly in view of the
rigid compliance with formality necessitated under the rule of the General Electric
decision.
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has the right to license whom he pleases to manufacture his product, -7 and
since a partial assignment, rather than a complete sale, is involved, his rights
in the product are not wholly exhausted thereby. lie may legally dictate
certain terms on which the patented product, manufactured under license,
may be sold.28 Therefore the requirement that Ethyl-treated gasoline be sold
only to particular jobbers appears to be a valid use of the license contract
device, safely within the scope of the patent monopoly. With the power thus
to dictate to whom its product may be sold, the Ethyl Corporation has further
extended its control by a second exercise of the license contract, this time
directly to the jobber. But since the legality of any e.x-press conditions in
the second license as to resale would be highly doubtful," this license is more
or less innocent in its express requirements. In essence, the jobber license
is merely an indirect instrument to enable the patentee to exercise the third
technique--the common-law right to refuse to sell.
The defendant has thus combined the only two restrictive devices available
that have been declared not in conflict with the anti-trust laws, and, super-
ficially, the combination seems to have been successful. But on closer analysis,
certain doubts arise. Since there has been a complete sale by the refiner
licensee, the patent monopoly is exhausted, and any further conditions on
the resale of the article must find their validity under general lawS0 The
question is then posed as to whether or not the facts of the instant case are
such as to be within the approval of United States v'. Colgale and Company.31
It was there held that the manufacturer had the right to select his own
customers and thus refuse to sell to those who did not abide by his podicies.
Here, however, the patentee is not selecting its own customers through the
jobber license, but rather the customers of its refiner licensees. While it is
true that the first complete sale of the patented combination is to the jobher,
nevertheless the defendant corporation receives payment from its refiners,
determined on a basis entirely independent of the price at which the refiners
sell to jobbers. Moreover, it is stipulated that "apart from the issuance of
licenses to jobbers, the only business relations of the defendant corporation
with jobbers are in the promotion of sales by the jobbers of gasoline treated
with fluid and in connection with the investigation of jobbers." 2 It would
27. This would appear to be true, under the theory of the right to refuse t scl1
as laid down in the Colgate case, even though no patents were involved.
28. Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70 (1902) (patentee maty fix price
at which licensee shall sell) ; United States v. General Electric Cc,., 272 U. S. 476 (1924)
(patentee may fix prices at, and specify persons to whom, licenee may ge11 ) : General
Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U. S. 175 (103M, reaffirmeid.
59 Sup. Ct. 116 (U. S. 1938) (patentee may restrict license to manufacture aind Fell
to a particular field).
But the patentee cannot exact as a condition of a license that unpatentcd naterials to
be used in connection with the invention shall be purchased only from him. Carbice
Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp.. 283 U. S. 27 (1931) ; Leitch Mfg. Co.
v. Barber Co., 302 U. S. 458 (1938).
29. See notes 3 and 4, supra.
30. See cases cited supra note 2.
31. 250 U. S. 300 (1919).
32. Stipulation, p. 11, United States v. Ethyl Gasoline Corporation.
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seem that this elaborate and continued investigation of jobbers brings the
situation more in line with Federal Trade Commission v. Bcechmnut Packing
Company33 than with the Colgate case. While there appear to be no express
rules which dictate the granting or refusal of jobber license applications,
and while "jobber licenses have not been cancelled because of the failure of
a jobber to maintain the policies, practices and prices of the major oil col-
panies," 34 nevertheless the very lack of evidence as to the criteria upon which
jobber licenses have been refused could be so interpreted as to raise a pre-
sumption against the defendant corporation. It is stipulated that the mere
recommendation of a field representative largely determines whether a license
will be issued, and that "following the customary practice of the company,
the field representatives usually have not set forth the reasons why recom-
mendations have been made against the issuance of licenses."35 What seems
to be the key to the whole of the defendant company's marketing system
appears in the explanation given for this secrecy. "To a large extent this was
due to the reluctance on the part of defendant corporation to preserve in its
records the extent to which the maintenance of the gasoline prices and
marketing policies by jobbers entered into the granting of licenses." Thus
the rule of the Beechnut case as to illegal methods of investigation is ostensibly
avoided simply by keeping no records which might later be introduced into
evidence. Yet this pseudo-legal device has been eminently successful in
permitting the standards desired by the defendant to control the resale of
lead-treated gasoline. The greatest number of jobber licenses that have been
turned down have been rejected because of adverse findings of field repre-
sentatives as to "business ethics,"31 and it is within the power of the defendant
corporation to cancel licenses at any time on these or any other arbitrary
grounds. The result is that "a large number of refiners and a majority of
jobbers believe that a jobber must maintain 'business ethics' in order to
obtain a license, and that a number of jobbers believe that jobber licensees
are required to maintain the prices and abide by the marketing practice.q and
policies of the major oil companies." 38 The defendant corporation, while
nominally following the letter of the law, 0 has thus stimulated an attitude
on the part of its jobber licensees that has given it actual control of the
marketing of seventy per cent of the total gasoline sold in the United States.4 0
While this control might technically be found valid under the Colgate case,
a decision construing liberally the policy laid down in the Beechnut Case, and
33. 257 U. S. 441 (1922). See note 14, supra.
34. Stipulation, p. 22, United States v. Ethyl Gasoline Corporation.
35. Id. at 18.
36. Id. at 19.
37. Id. at 20.
38. Id. at 21.
39. It might well be argued that this result makes the jobber license in the instant
case similar to the express -requirements of the jobber licenses involved in tie Standard
Sanitary and Schradcr's Sons cases. But the contrary argument that those cases were
not based on the jobber license alone [see note 4, supral would weaken the force of a
decision based only on this ground.
40. 11,000 of the 12,000 jobbers doing business in the United States have been granted
licenses. Stipulation, p. 11, United States v. Ethyl Gasoline Corporation.
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applying those principles to the investigatory practices involved in the instant
situation, could be reached with equal facility.
One factor for consideration will be the extent to which the Bccclhntd
decision has been modified, if at all, by state "Fair Trade Laws"'4 and the
Miller-Tydings amendment to the Sherman Act. 2 While indicative of a
changing anti-trust policy, the NMiller-Tydings amendment is probably inap-
plicable to the instant case. That statute applies only to products carrying
the manufacturer's brand name. Approximately ninety-four per cent of all
lead-treated gasoline is of the so-called regular variety,43 bearing only the
refiner's trade name, and not that of the Ethyl Corporation. Furthermore,
since seventy per cent of all gasoline sold at retail44 contains Ethyl Fluid, the
defendant corporation's product can hardly be deemed to be "in free and
open competition with goods of the same general class," as the new law
requires. 45 But whatever the present status of the Beechniut rule, the manner
of its application in the instant case should be a valuable step towards ac-
curate delimitation of the over-vague boundaries of the scope of the patent
monopoly.4 6
REVOCATION OF A PATENT BY GOVERNMENT SUIT
REPLACEMENT of unread congressional reports1 by dramatic newspaper
headlines 2 has brought home to the American public the existence of evils
stemming from the patent monopoly. Patent laws designed to further science
and the useful arts3 have been at times twisted to permit evasion of anti-
41. For a representative statute, see N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 976.
42. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 (Supp. 1938).
43. Stipulation, p. 10, United States v. Ethyl Gasoline Corporation.
44. Ibid.
45. Furthermore, prices are not uniform in a single competitive area, and the
defendant corporation is not establishing prices by direct written contracts with retailers,
both of which have been held necessary for the application of a state Fair Trade Act.
See Calvert v. Nussbaum, 166 Mis. 342, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 320 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
46. An injunction would have little deleterious effect on either the defendant cor-
poration's products or its profits. The Ethyl Corporation argues that considerations of
public health, the maintenance of the quality of the product, and the protection of gd
will all militate for the continuance of the jobber licensing system. These arguments
are obviously make-weights, however, for no reason appears why these functions could
not be as adequately performed by the refiner licensees, whose interest in them, in view
of the fact that the product is finally sold under their brand name, would be at least
as strong as those of the defendant corporation.
1. H. R. REP. No. 1161, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912): Hearings before Comtadlt e.
on Patents on S. 3223, H. R. 9032. 66th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1919) h e1arings before Con-
inittee on Patents on H. R. 4.523,. 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
2. See, e.g., N. Y. Times. Dec. 13, 1938, p. 1, col. 4.
3. U.S. Coxsr. Art. I, § 8.
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trust legislation, 4 blocking of industrial progress' and undue concentration of
capital. 6 Although a legislative re-examination of the entire patent system
will undoubtedly be demanded 7-and is probably necessary to attack proced-
ural perversions effectivelys-a cursory glance at history and case-law indi-
cates that within the corpus of existing patent doctrine lie concepts adequate
to remedy many of the present ills. In some instances dicta, hallowed by time
alone, might have to be disregarded, but at most a change from stalus quo to
status quo ante would be required. Among suggested methods of reform is
recourse to the historic remedy afforded by government suit to revoke patents
which have been employed to achieve ends not in keeping with the purposes
of the grant. Patentees using their privilege to block industrial progress, or
to lend a semblance of legality to a monopolistic industrial structure, or as
a litigatory club to pulverize incipient competition appear to place themselves
without the pale of patent protection and subject their grant to a liability
to forfeiture.
In the turbulent swirl of conflicting ideas at the Constitutional Conven-
tion, unique indeed was the unanimous approval which greeted the proposals
to grant Congress the power to encourage science and the useful arts by
securing to authors and inventors exclusive rights to their creations for a
limited time.0 Viewed against a background of colonial hostility to monop-
oly, the unanimity becomes significant. The colonists, familiar with the abuses
of Elizabethan monopolies, had been unflinching in their efforts to prevent
transplantation of the system to the New World.' 0 The Revolution itself
had been largely a product of the mother country's monopolistic trade poli-
cies ;11 and when, despite state constitution and statute,12 monopoly had sprung
up, vigorous efforts to stamp it out had immediately been inaugurated.' 3 Not
4. E.g., Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20 (1912) ; National
Electric Products Co. v. Circular Flexible Conduit Co., 86 F. (2d) 84 (C. C. A. 2d, 193o),
cert. denied, 301 U. S. 684 (1937). See Rice, A Constructive Patent Law (1939) 16 N. Y.
U. L. Q. REv. 179, 190.
5. The picturesque adjectives "scarecrow, .... shotgun," "blocking," and "fencing,"
are adequately descriptive of the devices used to frighten off research and to stifle comu-
petitive devices. See Vaughan, Suppression and Non-Working of Patents (1919) 9 Am.
Eco,. REv. 693, 696-698; N. Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1938, p. 36, col. 3; Hearings on H. R.
4523, supra note 1, at 566-568, 929-934, 940-947.
6. A worthless patent in the hands of a rich corporation can be used to drive coin-
petitors with less financial power out of an industry or to force them to sell their patent
rights at a price of the vendee's choosing. Hearings on H. R. 452?3, supra note 1, at
481-496, 572-575, 935-936; N. Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1938, p. 6, col. 2.
7. See N. Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1938, p. 8, col. 2; NEWS WEEK (Dec. 26, 1938) 32.
8. See Rice, supra note 4, at 180-184; ef. Columbia Motor Car Co. v. Duer, 184
Fed. 893 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911).
9. See TouLmIx, INVENTION AND THE LAW (1936) 10.
10. 1 CLARK, HISTORY OF MAANUFACTURES IN THE UNITED STATES (1929) 47; Jones,
Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition (1926) 36 YALIE L. J. 42,
43-46.
11. BEARD, THB RISE OF AmEmCAN CIVILIZATION (1930) 193-195, 202, 224-225;
Jones, supra note 10, at 50-52.
12. Jones, supra note 10, at 52-55, 210.
13. Jones, supra note 10, at 43-46, 52-55; (1920) 33 HAaV. L. Ruv. 838. 839.
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every grant of exclusive right had been frowned upon. Letters-patent had
been issued to inventors and innovators bringing a new industry to the com-
monwealth14-exceptions to the general policy countenanced by English com-
mon law. 15 Efforts had likewise been made to protect the right of copy of
authors.:6 Yet precautions against abuse of even these limited monopolies
were customary. Provisions designed to prevent unreasonable prices and to
force the patentee to "work" his grant were common.27 From the seeming
inconsistency between the basic antipathy toward monopoly' 8 and the cor-
dial reception accorded the Madison-Pinckney proposals at the Convention
but one conclusion is indicated. The Founding Fathers apparently contem-
plated bestowing upon the new Congress power to grant only such privileges
as were sanctioned by common law and declared in the English Statute of
Monopolies.' 9 The inference is confirmed by the wording of the final draft
of the Constitution - and the enthusiasm for the patent law exhibited by such
a stem foe of monopoly as Jefferson.2 1
The English philosophy, presumably embodied in our constitutional provi-
sion, contemplated severe restrictions upon the grant and liability to for-
feiture for misuse or nonuse of the privilege. The power of the crown to
repeal its grants summarily without judicial proceedings, hanging in tcr-
rorero over the owners of early English patents, served as a deterrent to
14. 1 CLARK, op. cit. supra note 10, at 4S-53; VA-UGHA., EcoNoMsIcs oF On PATE;T
SYsmu (1925) 19-22.
15. See Hulme, On the History of Patent Law in the Svteenlth and Eighteenth
Centuries (1902) 18 L. Q. REv. 280, 281.
16. Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of thc Consiltution
(1929) 17 GEo. L. J. 109, 116.
17. 1 CLARK, op. cit. supra note 10, at 48-53. Economic conditions made such provi-
sions inevitable. It is significant that South Carolina, a pioneer in patent legislation, and
the native state of Pinckney, one of the two proponents of protection for inventors and
authors at the Convention, had a compulsory licensing statute. See Schecter, Would
Compulsory Licensing of Patents be Unconstitutional (1936) 22 VA. L. rEv. 287, 301-
306, 311.
18. See 1 ELLIOTT, DEBATES ON THE FmEaL CONSTITLVrION: (18%6) 496; Schecter,
supra note 17, at 309. A more extensive grant of power to Congress was proposed and
"silently abandoned." See 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON TH COxsrLTT0Iox (5th ed.
1891) 85.
19. 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1623). This statute has been declared to be incorporated into our
fundamental law as defining "the inalienable rights of freemen which our ancestors
brought with them to this country." See Butchers Union Y. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S.
746, 762 (1884). Actually, since innovators ate not included, the class of grants con-
templated by the Constitution is narrower than that permitted by common law. See
Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns 507, 560-561, 583-585 (N. Y. 1812).
20. The word "patent," present in earlier drafts [See, e.g., 1 Eu.io DEBAnTs ox
THE FEDEiL.L CONSTITUTION (1866) 247] is not used in the Constitution. See Sehecter,
supra note 17, at 309. But see Fenning, supra note 16, at 116.
21. Compare Jefferson's attitude toward patents [CruNAnD, TIE CoMMUso'-zLACE
Boor OF THo. As JEFFE.RsoN (1926) 391] with his attitude toward monopuly in general.
BEAmRD, JEFFERSON, CORPORATIONS AND THE CoNSTITLriox (1936) 14.
92. E.g., Elizabeth's Proclamation Concerning Monopolies. Nov. 28. 1601, reprinted
in PRIcE, ENGLISH PATENTS OF MONOPOLY (1913) 156-157. See United States v. Amer-
ican Bell Tel. Co., 123 U. S. 315, 360 (188).
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flagrant abuse. Every patent grant since the Statute of Monopolies has set
forth the power of the king or any six members of the Privy Council to
revoke it for specified causes. 23 And from earliest times the king, as parens
patriae, resorted to his courts to have franchises adjudged void even tho ugh
the abuse was not specifically mentioned in the grant as a cause for forfeit-
ure.
24
The personal prerogative of the crown to make and repeal grants does not
enter into our principles of state, but the sovereign's prerogatives as trustee
for the public do. 5 In proceedings paralleling those utilized by the crown
to repeal patents, states have successfully atlacked their own grants for nis-
use and nonuse.26 Within the sphere of its granted powers, the federal gov-
ernment has all the attributes of sovereignty.27 Like the states, it may seek
to have adjudged forfeit franchises so abused as to be violative of the pur-
pose of the grant ;28 and, despite early doubts,29 the patent monopoly remains
a franchise3 ° and the creature of statute.31 The inference that the United
States may, in suitable situations, resort to its courts to revoke letters-patent
appears inescapable. Further analysis confirms the conclusion that the judi-
ciary possesses inherent power to make the forfeiture effective. The grant
to Congress of the power to create patent rights precluded the states from
exercising the power to destroy them.32 The statute-long since repealed-
23. See The Queen v. Eastern Archipelago Co., 1 E. & B. 310, 352 (Q. B. 1853);
In re Hatschek's Patent, 26 Rep. Pat. Cas. 228, 244-245 (Ch. D. 1909).
24. Y. B. 15 Ed. IV, f. 7 b (1475); see 4 Co. INsT. 72, 79; GoDsox, Tim LAw o'
PATENTS FOR INVENTION (1823) 190-195; United States v. American Bell Tel. Co.,
128 U. S. 315, 360 (1888); State Bank v. State, 1 Blackf. 267, 279 (Ind. 1823).
25. See Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227, 239 (U. S. 1873);
United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 159 U. S. 548, 554 (1895) ; ef. United States
v. Beebe, 127 U. S. 338 (1888).
26. The writs of scire facias and quo warranto were used to attack patents. See
3 BL. Com. ** 260-262; Davis, Early History of the Patent Specification (1934) 50 L.
Q. REv. 260, 269.
27. See McCulloch" v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405-406 (U. S. 1819); ef. Massa-
chusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 485-486 (1923).
28. Cf. Territory v. Lockwood, 3 Wall. 236, 240 (U. S. 1865) ; Delmar jockey Club
v. Missouri, 210 U. S. 324, 333-334 (1908); State v. Kress & Co., 115 Fla. 189, 190-
203, 155 So. 823, 826-828 (1934).
29. See Carr v. Rice, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,440, at 141 (S. D. N. Y. 1856). The French
"natural right" theory of patents gained fairly wide currency. See Ladas, Patents (1934)
12 ENCc. Soc. ScImcEs 19-20.
30. See Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U. S. 225, 226 (1877) ; Swindell v. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co., 230 Fed. 438, 442 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916) ; cf. Lillard v. Loergan, 72 F.
(2d) 865, 870 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 615 (1934).
31. The Constitution merely grants to Congress the authority to secure exclusive
rights to inventors for limited times, a power which it may or may not choose to exer-
cise. See Bird v. Elaborated Roofing Co., 256 Fed. 366, 373 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919), cert.
denied, 250 U. S. 647 (1919). That the patent is not a common law right, see Crown
Co. v. Nye Tool Works, 261 U. S. 24, 40 (1923). For analogy between revocation of
1tters-patent and corporate charters, see United States v. Gunning, 18 Fed. 511, 512
(C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1883) (justifying government suit to revoke a patent by this anal-
ogy) ; Comment (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 815, 822-823.
32. States, acting within their police powers, may restrict the use of patented articles,
but they cannot interfere with the patentee's power to exclude others. See Patterson
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permitting individuals to attack patents for specified causesm is indicative
that authority to revoke was not reserved to the people. Neither Congress,
nor President, nor Patent Office, under the present statute, may repeal letters-
patent once they have issued." By default, as well as by historical analogy,
the power must lie with the courts.3z
While the prerogative of the federal government to institute suit and the
inherent authority of the courts to declare patents forfeit should be clear, 0
the situations in which the remedy could be invoked are more equivocal. De-
fendants, in proof that their conduct did not violate the conditions and pur-
poses of the grant, might lean heavily on oft repeated dicta that the patentee
takes nothing from the public and discharges his entire obligation by disclos-
ing the nature of his invention.3 7 Such reliance should prove unavailing, for
the former statement is untrue, and the latter is historically indefensible. Not
only is the right of others to invent and use the thing patented taken from the
public-and the history of invention with its dusters of parallelisms39 is indi-
cative that this is a very real loss-but the privilege of a subsequent inventor
to donate the discovery to the people is extinguislied. 9 The doctrine that
disclosure represents the inventor's entire consideration did not enter the law
until the middle of the eighteenth century.40 Patents, both in the American
colonies and in England, were granted in exchange for the establishment of
a new trade or the placing of the patented article in active use.4 1 Specifica-
v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501, 508 (1878); Jordan v. Overseers, 4 Ohio 294, 310 (1831);
NVeisberger, State Control Over Patent Rights and Patented Articles (1938) 20 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc. 183.
33. 1 STAT. 323 (1793) ; cf. Ex parte Vood & Brundage, 9 Wheat. 603 (U. S. 1824).
34. See United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 1M U. S. 315, 363 (188); Mc-
Cormick fachine Co. v. Aultman, 169 U. S. 606, 608 (1898).
35. See Dartmouth College v. Woodard, 4 Wcat. 518, 698 (U. S. 1819); 2 Rca-
Ixsox ox PATxIs (1890) 468 et seq.
36. United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U. S. 315 (18M) ; see United States
v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U. S. 224, 264-265 (1897) ; Knight v. Rite Shoe Co., 23
F. (2d) 903, 905 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928). The courts have taken it upon themselves to
grant what are in effect compulsory licenses when a supervening public policy appeared
to demand them. Missouri v. American Bell Tel. Co., 23 Fed. 539 (C. C. E. D. Mo.
1885) ; State v. Delaware & American Tel. & Tel. Co., 47 Fed. 633 (C. C. D. Del. 1891J,
aff'd, 50 Fed. 677 (C. C. A. 3d, 1892). Contra: Andrea, Inc. v. Radio Corp. of Amer-
ica, 88 F. (2d) 474 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 681 (1937), (1937) 46
YALE L. J. 1402.
37. See Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218, 241 (U. S. 1832) ; United States v. Dubilier
Condensor Corp., 289 U. S. 178, 186-187 (1933).
38. See Gilfillan, Social Principles of Invention (1934) 16 J. Pvr. OF. Sec. 30;
Hough, The Law and the Telephone (1916) 50 Am. L. REv. 425.
39. See 2 Roarxsox ox P.A-ETs (1890) 473-474. 'Many medical patents, for ex-
ample, have been donated to public institutions. See Hearings on H. R. 45z3, stipra note 1,
at 565.
40. See Hulme, On the Consideration of the Patent Grant, Post and Present (1897)
13 L. Q. Rav. 313, 317-318; Hulme, On the History of Patent Law in the 17th and rSth
Centuries (1902) 18 L. Q. REv. 280, 2,83.
41. VAr'aa.VHx, op. cit. supra note 14, at 19-20; Davis, The Early History of the
Patent Specification (1934) 50 L. Q. RE . 86, 97-109; Hulme, Consideration of Patent
Grant, supra note 40, at 313.
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tion, at first a sporadic prerequisite, originated as a device for the convenience
of the crown and the protection of the patentee.
42
The Statute of Monopolies voided grants to inventors which were "contrary
to law and mischievous to the state by raising the prices of commodities at
home or in hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient." While there are no
reported cases prior to 1795 construing this provision, it was never doubted
that patents, valid when issued, which produced those baneful effects by which
Coke distinguished odious monopolies, 43 were void. 44 Since the provisions
of the Constitution contemplated grants no broader than those valid under
the British statute, patentees who not only contravene the Statute of Monopo-
lies but, in addition, utilize their grants to block industrial progress, would
seem to breach to the essence the implicit conditions upon which their fran-
chises were awarded.4 5 Even adopting the rationale that the present system
acts merely as an incentive4" and that diszlosure represents the inventor's full
consideration for his grant, it does not follow that Congress has given pat-
entees a chartered privilege to act with impunity. Patents so utilized as to
violate the laws of the sovereignty granting them appear to subject themselves
to forfeiture. 47 When an individual employs letters-patent to regulate the
entrance of entrepreneurs into an established trade the power of the sover-
eign to act should be equally clear. 48
42. Davis,_ supra note 41, at 260-270; Hulme, supra note 41, at 317.
43. 3 Co. INsT. 181, 184.
44. See Hornblower v. Boulton, 8 T. R. 95, 99-101 (K. B. 1799) ; Universities of
Oxford and Cambridge v. Richardson, 6 Ves. 690, 712 (Ch. 1802); GoDsoN, op. eit.
supra note 24, at 190-195.
45. See Altoona Publix Theatres v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U. S. 477, 493
(1935). The practices listed in note 5, supra, seem directly opposed to the purpose of the
Constitutional provision "to promote science and the useful arts." See Blount Mfg. Co.
v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 166 Fed. 555, 561 (C. C. D. Mass. 1909) ; Hearings on H. R.
4523, supra note 1, at 496. The practice of suppressing patents has been similarly con-
demned. See Ewart Mfg. Co. v. Baldwin Cycle Chain Co., 91 Fed. 262, 265 (C. C. D.
Mass. 1898); Bakewell, The Protection of Unuscd Patents (1907) 19 GR rN, BA(, 406,
It is interesting that the leading cases cited as permitting suppression by no means grant
free rein to do so. See Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Thompson & Co., 21 Rep.
Pat. Cas. 473, 478-479 (Ch. D. 1904) ; Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag
Co., 210 U. S. 405, 429-430 (1908) ; Feuer, The Patent Monopoly and the Antil-Trust
Laws (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1145, 1148-1150.
46. See De La Vergne Refrigerating Machine Co. v. Featherstone, 147 U. S. 209,
221 (1893) ; Willof, Patents in Modern Social Systems (1933) 15 J. PAT. OFF. Soc, 985.
47. Patentees using their grants in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts would
seem to subject themselves to this contingency. Use of patents as a basis for harassing
litigation appears to be an unfair trade practice prohibited by the Federal Trade Con-
mission Act. Cf. MEMSORANDUM ON UNFAIR COMxPETITION (Fed. Trade Comm. 1910)
141-149. Suits to effect forfeiture should be brought only where patentees are involved
in habitual statutory violations. Evidence of continued practice would be a sine qna non
of a suit under the Federal Trade Commission Act, for suit for infringement in any one
case could be defended as a lawful method of protecting the patentee's statutory rights.
See International Visible Systems Corp. v. Remington Rand, 65 F. (2d) 540, 542
(C. C. A. 6th, 1933).
48. The control wielded by the Hartford-Empire Co. over the glass industry seems
analogous to that attempted by the State of Oklahoma over the ice business and struck
down in New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U. S. 262 (1932) as an invasion of rights
The government, in a suit to repeal a patent, can find further concepts to
bolster its position. The ancient doctrines of nuisance and of sic utcrc indi-
cate that the law approves the destruction of property used in a manner suffi-
ciently inimical to the common good.49 The declaratory judgment offers a
further method of policing the patent system.P0 The United States, seeking
to relieve the public from the burden of an improperly granted nonopoly, '
might by such an action question the validity of a patent. Monopolistic
schemes, based upon invalid grants,Z2 might thus in many instances be more
effectively attacked than by action under the anti-trust laws,53 and in view of
the strict attitude already taken toward "paper" patents,54 the threat afforded
by such proceedings might cause the abandonment of at least some of the
present practices.
A Congressional attack on patent abuses is perhaps both necessary and in-
evitable, but the road which legislative reforms must follow will not be easy.
Opposition to change in our patent law has been tenacious; proponents of
reform differ vigorously among themselves ;5 and our magnificent industrial
development affords defenders of the status quo a powerful post hoc argu-
ment.56 Legislation expressly empowering the government to police the
patent system, without creating a special body to do so, would have to depend
largely on its in terrorcm effectiveness. A verdict for the United States in
the litigation suggested, besides affording immediate relief in the industry
involved, might well serve the same purpose. It would further insure a more
liberal treatment of future legislation by the courts. Should such suits fail,
they would nonetheless serve a useful purpose in keeping alive the realizatron
of existing ills. And defeat itself might serve to smooth the path for legisla-
tive reform, lessening, perhaps, the intransigeant attitude of those opposed to
change and, at the same time, indicating more clearly the nature of the re-
forms needed.
guaranteed by the Constitution to the individual. The dissenting opinion, p. 280 ct seq.,
nowhere denies that a similar control vested in private individuals would be invalid. Cf.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 537 (1935).
49. See In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 586-590 (1895) ; 2 COOLEY, COmNsrnTUo.AL Ll...t-
ITATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 1240.
50. A suit to determine the validity of a patent may be brought unler fie Fderal
Declaratory Judgments Act. Edelman & Co. v. Triple-A-Specialty Co., 83 F. (2d) 852
(C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
51. The United States has sufficient interest to bring such a suit. United States v.
American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U. S. 315 (1MR8); see Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U. S.
224, 234 (1892).
52. See Hearings on H. R. 4523, supra note 1, at 957-964.
53. It is an open question whether the United States can attack the validity of a
patent in an anti-trust suit. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 33 F. (2d) 617, 623
(N. D. Il1. 1929); Lamb, The Relation of the Patent Lawzs to the Federal Anti-Trust
Laws (1927) 12 CORx L. Q. 261, 280. Hartford-Empire's patents, for e.ample, could
presumably best be tested in a declaratory judgment suit.
54. See General Chemical Co. v. Selden Co., 67 F. (2d) 133, 134 (C. C. A. 3d,
1933); Dooley Improvement Co. v. Motor Improvement Co., IS F. Supp. 340, 344 (D.
Del. 1937).
55. See VAUGHAN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 224-249.
56. See Billman, The Compulsory Vorkhing of Patents (1912) 24 GXE:N- BAG 513;
Fish, Letters Patent in Relation to Industrial Conditions (1913) A. B. A. RP. 805, S07.
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USURY STATUTES AND INSTALMENT SALES*
ALTHOUGH historical justification for application of usury laws to instal-
ment sales may readily be found,' modern decisions with rare dissent have
refused to limit the instalment seller's charge for credit extension to the
interest rate permitted by usury statutes. 2 This position has generally been
defended with the unconvincing argument that the interest charged is as
important a component part of the consideration for the sale as the principal;
and, consequently, the interest in question must not be viewed as a return
for the loan of money or forbearance of a debt, but rather as part of the
purchase price of specific goods.3 The early cases reaching this result in-
volved sales of assets, such as realty, which lacked standard market values."
The ensuing decisions may well have sprung from a judicial appreciation of
the administrative difficulty of separating the lump credit sales price of a
unique asset into cash value and interest. In addition, the judiciary may have
realized that even after the difficulty of ascertaining a cash value had been
surmounted the increment between that value and the credit sales price might
represent not only interest but also other factors such as superior salesman-
ship.5 Consequently, if the difference between cash and credit prices be allo-
cated solely to interest charges, the usury statute might assume an unintended
scope by becoming a vehicle of price-fixing. Whatever may have been the
functional explanation of the refusal to break down lump credit prices into
component parts in order to apply usury statutes, later decisions have blindly
followed the resulting precedent in cases where the article sold has a recog-
nized cash value and even in situations involving explicit reservations of
usurious interest.0 Only occasional recognition has been accorded the fact
that the risk of loss borne by the instalment seller is greater than that of the
*Failing v. National Bond & Investment Corp., 168 Misc. 617, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 67
(City Ct. 1938) ; Universal Credit Co. v. Lowell, 166 Misc. 15, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 743
(City Ct. 1938), (1938) 23 C6R-;. L. Q. 619.
1. See Berger, Usury in Instalnent Sales (1935) 2 LAW & CoNmEMP. PrOn. 148,
154-170.
2. See, e.g., Zazzaro v. Colonial Acceptance Corp., 117 Conn. 251, 167 Atd. 734
(1933) ; Pierce v. C. I. T. Corp., 170 Okla. 633, 41 P. (2d) 481 (1935); cf. Oil City
Motor Co. v. C. I. T. Corp., 76 F. (2d) 589 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935), (1935) 35 COL, L.
REv. 1322.
3. Commercial Credit Co. v. Tarwater, 215 Ala. 123, 110 So. 39 (1929); Keefe
v. Bush & Lane Piano Co., 247 Mich. 82, 225 N. W. 585 (1929).
4. See, e.g., Beete v. Bidgood, 7 B. & C. 453 (K. B. 1827); Tousey v. Robinson,
58 Ky. 663 (1859). At present, the instalment sale device is generally used in the sale of
standard articles. See BARTLETT AND REED, METHODS OF INSTALMENT SELLING AND
COLLECTION (1934) 10.
5. See Ecker, Commentary on "Usury in Instalment Sales" (1935) 2 LAW & CON-
TEMP. P on. 173.
6. McAnsh v. Blauner, 222 App. Div. 381, 226 N. Y. Supp. 379 (1st Dep't 1928),
aff'd, 248 N. Y. 537, 162 N. E. 515 (1928) ; Atlas Securities Co. v. Copeland, 124 Kan.
393, 260 Pac. 659 (1927). Contra: E. Tris Napier Co. v. Trawick, 164 Ga. 781, 139 S. E.
552 (1927).
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commercial lender so as to necessitate a higher compensation for instalment
credit extension.
7
Two recent decisions in New York, however, depart from this line of
authority and hold instalment contracts void upon the ground that the differ-
ence between the cash and credit prices constitutes usurious interest.8 The
result of these decisions seems economically undesirable. Usury laws have
been developed to preclude unconscionable loans and to narrow the discrep-
ancy between the bargaining position of lender and financially harassed
borrowerY These statutes effectuate their policy by the prescription of a
fixed rate of interest which applies to all transactions within their scope ir-
respective of exigencies and equities.10 Mthough their basic philosophy is
laudable, an application of usury laws to all transactions which permit char-
acterization as loans seems an uneconomic restraint on business freedom, since
the rigidity of the permissible rate prevents recognition of the wide variations
in cost between the different types of standard lending transactions.1 1 The
statutory rate of return seems fitted to meet the problems growing out of the
large commercial loan. In this type of transaction the ex%-pense of investigation
of credit standings and the cost of collection are relatively small. Further-
more, the hazard of loss is very slight since the lender is usually in a position
to select borrowers with relatively sound credit standings and to require them
to hypothecate readily convertible security. Hence the statutory rate has
proved sufficiently compensatory. 12
Yet the same statutes have proved completely unworkable in respect to
loans of less than $300. A variety of factors pertaining to the small loan such
as the character of the borrower, the duration of the loan, the nature of the
collateral securing it and the administrative expenses of the lender force the
cost of the loan far above the usury rate of' return.13 Realizing that application
of the usury rate to these transactions would drive the honest small lender
out of business and deprive the wage earner of this source of credit, most
states have passed small loan acts.14 which usually permit a monthly rate on
7. In re Bibbey, 9 F. (2d) 944 (D. 'Minn. 1925); Ricker Y. Fay Securities Co.,
110 Cal. App. 750, 294 Pac. 732 (1931).
8. Failing v. National Bond & Investment Corp., 168 Misc. 617. 6 X. Y. S. (2d)
67 (City Ct. 1938); Universal Credit Co. v. Lowell, 166 Misc. 15, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 743
(City Ct. 1938), (1938) 23 CoRN. L. Q. 619.
9. See RYAN, USURY AND USURY LAWS (1924) 126: McConlogue. Csury (1928)
1 So. CALIF. L. REv. 253.
10. Partch v. Krogman, 202 Iowa 524, 210 N. W. 612 (1926) ; Burdon v. Unrath,
47 R. I. 227, 132 At. 728 (1926).
11. See RYA.N-, USURY AN.D USURY LAws (1924); Comment (1930) 39 YALE L J.
408: (1938) 23 CORN L. Q. 619.
12. See ROBINSON AND NUGF.NT, REGuLATIomN OF THE SMxALL LOA.%N BUSINESS (193i)
32; Comment (1929) 42 HARV. L. REv. 6S9. But cf. RyAN. op. cit. supro note 9, at 110.
13. See HILEORN, PHILOSOPHY OF UNIFORM SMALL Lo.%- LAw (1923) (Russell Sage
Foundation Pamphlet) ; Hilborn, The Small Loan Act (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 581. For
tabular classifications of the various factors, see Ronisox A.n Sin. wns, TEN- THOUSAND
SMALL LOANS (1930).
14. See RYANw, op. cit. supra note 9, at 127 et seq.; Comment (1929) 42 HAIW. L
REV. 689; Isaacs, Book Review (1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 993.
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unpaid balance of 3/ 2 7%.15 Factually, the instalment sale bears a closer re-
semblance to the small loan than to the large commercial loan. Cost and risk
factors are strikingly similar.' The instalment seller, however, is in a better
position than the small lender in reference to security. 17 Consequently it
would seem that neither the interest rate established by usury statutes nor
that provided in small loan acts is suitable to meet the economic conditions
peculiar to the business of instalment selling.'
But if usury laws are found applicable to instalment sales, there is no
possible legal reason which would prevent like application of the small loan
statutes.' 9 By procuring small loan licenses, 20 instalment vendors of products
which cost less than $300 could legally seek an annual return of 42%,,21 while
sellers of articles costing more than that amount would be limited to the
usury rate which is generally less than 10%o per annum. 2 2 It would be mani-
festly unsound to permit this fortuitous dichotomy when the instalment seller
encounters very nearly the same costs and risks irrespective of the value of
his wares. In addition to the undesirable economic results which may flow
from an application of both usury statutes and small loan acts to instalment
sales, it would seem that such a procedure at best will offer only limited pro-
tection against credit sales abuses. Although both may readily be applied
to instalment sales of commodities with standard market values, both offer
almost insurmountable problems of valuation when the article has no standard
cash value. Consequently, the courts may be forced to leave the credit pur-
chaser of a unique article without recourse to either of these existing forms
of legislation. But even this limited form of protection seems desirable until
a more adequate method of meeting the abuses indigenous to instalment
selling 23 is provided.
2 4
15. A few states have reduced the 3'1% rate prescribed by the UNIFOIni SMALL LOAN
LAW. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS (1933) c. 140, § 100 (3% maximum); N. J. REv.
STAT. (1937) tit. 17, §§ 10--14 (22%).
16. See Nugent and Henderson, Instalment Selling and the Consumer: .4 Brief for
Regulation (1934) 173 ANNALS 93, 102; (1938) 23 CORN. L. Q. 619. Compare Comment
(1929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 689 with Legis. (1935) 49 HARV. L. REy. 128. But cf. Berger,
supra note 1, at 152, n. 26.
17. See Berger, supra note 1, at 152. The instalment vendor retains a security
interest in the subject of the sale; the small lender rarely is secured by satisfactory
collateral. See RoBiNSON AND STEARNS, 10C. cit. supra note 13, at 138-142.
18. The most apparent difference between instalment sale and loan is that for his
principal compensation the vendor depends upon the profit from the merchandising trans-
action while the lender's return is based solely upon the interest charged,
19. But cf. Stevens v. Grossman, 100 Ind. App. 417, 196 N. E. 123 (1935) ; Porter
v. Stolkin, 101 Ind. App. 705, 200 N. E. 74 (1936).
20. A license is a prerequisite to receipt of benefits conferred by the act. UN1roauR
SMALL LOAN LAW § 1.
21. See note 15, supra.
22. For the rates in the various states, see ROBINSON AND NUGENT, 10. cit, supra
note 12, at 67-69.
23. See BABSON, THE FOLLY OF INSTALMENT BUYING (1938) 60 et seq.; RErotr or-
THE COMMITTEE ON CONSUMtR CREDIT (Mass. 1936) c. 1.
24. Other stop-gaps are the injunction against repeated violations of the usury law
[6 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTs (Williston and Thompson ed. 1936) § 1682, n, 12], atid the
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A real solution can only be effected by legislation designed to cope with
the specific problems inherent in the instalment sale and to permit the instal-
ment purchaser to bargain equally with his vendor.2 5 Such legislation should
not seek to limit the vendor's return for his credit advance but to compel him
to make a full disclosure of all the elements involved in the sale. 3 The con-
tract should expressly state the cash price of the article, the down payment,
the differential between cash and credit price expressed in dollars and cents
as well as in terms of the monthly interest rate on the decreasing unpaid
balance, the insurance charge, the duration of the contract and the periodic
payments to be made thereunder. - Adequate disclosure coupled with protec-
tion against excessive fees and penalties for delinquency and repossession2
will afford the vendee the necessary safeguard that cannot be secured from
a haphazard application of small loan acts or usury statutes; and at the same
time, the seller will not be subjected to fortuitous price-fixing.
DEFENSES AGAINST FEDERAL TAX LIABILITY FOR IMPROPER
ACCUMULATIONS OF SURPLUS*
TiaE disparity in tax rates on individual and corporate income often tempts
the wealthy taxpayer falling within the high personal surtax brackets to
transfer income producing property to a corporation of which he is principal
stockholder." If he successfully escapes the penalties aimed at this type of
tax evasion, his tax burden will be greatly reduced by the transfer. As long
as earnings are retained by the corporation and no dividends distributed,
consent decree [N. Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1939, p. 44, col. 2 (violation of small loan law)].
Under the Wheeler-Lea Act [52 STAr. 114 (1938), 15 U. S. C. A. § 52 et seq. (Supp.
1938)] the Federal Trade Commission apparently can protect the instalment purclaser
from misleading advertising [See Legis. (1939) 39 Cot- L. RE%'. -59]; and perhaps
some aid may be found in state statutes regulating advertising [See Comment (1927)
36 YALE L. J. 1155].
25. See REPORT OF THE CoMnITr oN CoxsUMER CnrMr (Mass. 1936): Nugent
and Henderson, Instahnent Selling and the Consumer: A Brief for Regdation (1934)
173 AxxA. s 93. For a discussion of present legislation, see Legis. (1935) 49 HAII.
L. R . 128.
26. See Foster and Foster, Rate Aspects of Instalment Legislation (19351 2 Law
& Cox .xs. PaoB. 189; CREDrr FOR CoxsUMEvRrS (Pub. Affairs Comm. 1936) 24. But
the legislative trend would seem to favor a definite limitation on carrying Charges. See
e.g., Utah Laws 1935, c. 42, § 1; Wis. STAT. (1937) § 115.09.
27. See Legis. (1935) 49 Haav. L. REv. 128, 131.
28. Excessive fees and penalties frequently have been thrust upon the vendee. See
Nugent and Henderson, supra note 25, at 96; Adelson, The Mechanics of the Instalment
Credit Sale (1935) 2 LAW & CONTE-1P. PROB. 218. The recent legislation does not afford
protection against this.
* Blaffer & Co., 37 B.T.A., May 17, 1938.
1. See Finkelstein, The Corporate Entity and the Income Tax (1935) 44 Y"AL L J.
436; Martin, Taxation of Undistributed Profits (1936) 35 MICn. L REV. 44; Paul, The
Background of the Revenue Act of 1937 (1937) 5 U. or' Cm. L. Rrx. 41; Sherman,
Taxation of Corporations Used to Avoid Taxes Upon Stockholders (1935) 13 TAx Mo.
19, 78.
110519391 ANO7ES
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
income derived from the transferred property is not taxable to the stockholder,
but subject only to the relatively low corporate levy.2 Dividends may be
declared in years in which the principal -stockholder has deductible losses
or when individual tax rates are lowered by amendment. Surplus may also
be distributed through loans to the principal stockholder to be repaid upon
liquidation of the corporation after his death.3
Congressional attempts to thwart this practice have taken the form of
provisions stimulating payment of dividends by levying a penalty tax on
so-called improper accumulations of surplus.4 For many years these pro-
visions afforded but meagre protection against tax evasion.5 A recently
adopted policy of rigorous enforcement of the penalty tax by the Treasury
Department,6 however, is prophetic of an extensive campaign to collect past
due penalties. Coupled with new legislation this will furnish a real deterrent
2. The corporate income tax remained at a flat rate never exceeding 133.j% until
the Revenue Act of 1936, and at present, although a graduated tax, has a maximum rate
of 16%. On the other hand, the individual income tax had a maximum rate of 659 in
1929 and 75% under the 1938 Act. 391 C. C. H. 1939 Fed. Tax Serv., pp. 1003-1016. See
PAUL AND M Fnxs, THE- LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1934) §§ 2.02-2.12, (1938
Cum. Supp.) §§ 2.02-2.12.
3. See Sherman, supra note 1, at 20; Sweeney, The 1937 "Tax Loophole Act"
(1938) 26 GEo. L. J. 381, 695, 963.
4. The first method was the imposition of a tax directly on each shareholder of any
corporation improperly accumulating surplus according to his distributive share. 38 STAT.
166 (1913). The doubtful constitutionality of this provision led to levying a tax upon
the corporation directly. 42 STAT. 247 (1921). See Altman, Recent Devdopenots in In-
conic Tax Avoidance (1934) 29 IL. L. REv. 154. This tax, retained in subsequent Rev-
enue Acts, has had a minimum rate of 25% and a maximum rate of 60% of net incolne
which is to be computed by specific methods peculiar to this tax. 392 C. C. H. 1939
Fed. Tax Serv. 111 671-674.
5. Hoffman and Knox, Liability for Improper Accumulation of Surplus (1937)
15 TAX MAG. 200; Sherman, supra note 1, at 21. Doubts as to the constitutionality of
the corporate penalty were dispelled. United Business Corp. of America v. Commis,'ioner
of Internal Revenue, 62 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 635
(1933). But difficulties of proof and the severity of the penalty fostered a policy of
imposing it only in extreme cases. See Graubard, Accumulation of Surplus to Evade
Surtaxes (1932) 10 TAX MAG. 415, 458.
6. Lang, Surtaxes on "Personal Holding Companies" and Corporations "Improperly
Acctnulating Surplus" (1935) 13 TAX MAG. 274. The campaign of enforcement is im-
portant not only because the present Act will be effectively administered but also because
past Revenue Acts will be enforced. The various statutes of limitations included in each
Revenue Act do not seriously impede the Treasury Department's collection of this penalty
tax when past due. See PAUL AND MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 2, at §§ 50.04, 50.31.
7. The most important change was the enactment in 1934 of a graduated tax
ranging to 48% on the undistributed net income of all personal holding companies falling
within the statutory definition. A credit is allowed for dividends paid. 48 STAT'. 751
(1934), 26 U. S.C. § 331 (Supp. 1935). See 392 C. C. H. 1939 Fed. Tax Serv. 1629.
It is imposed regardless of whether the corporation was formed or availed of with a
purpose of furnishing shareholders a tax-saving. Increased rates in the 1938 Revenue
Act made this provision an effective check on the use of personal holding companies
falling within the Act. 52 STAT. 557, 26 U. S. C. A. § 331 (Supp. 1938). See Lang, supra
note 6, at 274; Paul, supra note 1, at 41; Sweeney, supra note 3, at 381.
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to the future interpolation of a corporation between wealthy taxpayers and
their income producing property.
The new importance of these provisions has stimulated a search for novel
arguments to prevent application of the tax. In a recent case 8 the taxpayer
raised the defense of an apparent conflict between this penalty on accumula-
tions and a state law making illegal the payment of dividends by an insolvent
corporation. The corporation in question was organized in Texas in 1929
to engage in trading securities. Its stock was wholly held by the organizer
and his wife except for three qualifying shares, and its assets consisted of
securities received from the two principal stockholders. Until 1932, the cor-
poration suffered heavy losses. During the years 1932 and 1934 the corpora-
tion realized net gains from trading activities, but failed to declare dividends
for the alleged reason that its assets had so decreased in market value that
it was insolvent and consequently, by virtue of Texas law, under a disability
to distribute dividends. The Board of Tax Appeals upheld the Commissioner's
contention that the corporation was responsible for the penalty levy regardless
of its inability to prevent, by declaring dividends, the accumulation of earnings.
The crux of the corporation's defense, a finding of insolvency, is dependent
upon employment of a disputed method of valuation. In determining the
legality of dividend declarations under state statutes of the type here involved'
it is generally conceded that with regard to operating companies fixed assets
are to be computed at cost and unrealized appreciation or depreciation may
not be considered.1 Current assets, however, are usually valued at the lowest
figure between cost and market and, therefore, market fluctuations may be
taken into consideration.'1 A peculiar problem is presented by the holding
or investment company. Whether assets consisting wholly of securities should
be deemed fixed or current has not been definitely determined. 12 Probably
. Blaffer & Co., 37 B. T. A., May 17, 1938.
9. The Texas statute purports to prevent distribution of dividends when the car-
poration is, or will thereby be rendered, insolvent by imposing liability for corporate
debts upon the directors to the extent of the dividends paid. Tsx. A, n. RE:v. Civ. STT.
(Vernon, 1925) art. 1347. Few cases have dealt with this situation, but the usual
definitions of insolvency would doubtless apply. Weiner, Theory of Anglo-.Aimcrican
Dividend Law (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 461, 465. See Hofkin v. United States Smelting
Co., 266 Fed. 679 (C. C. A. 3d, 1920), rcz,'g, 261 Fed. 546 (E. D. Pa. 1919) ; Rorkwo.a
v. Foshay, 66 F. (2d) 625 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933). For discussion of other types of dividend
restrictions see Weiner, Theory of Anglo-American Dhiidend Law (1928) 28 Co.. L.
REV. 1046, (1929) 29 COL. L Ray. 461, (1930) 30 CoL. L. RME. 330, 954; Hills, Federal
Taxation. v. Corporation Law (1937) 12 WVxs. L. Ry. 280.
10. Berle and Fisher, Elements of the Law of Business Accounting (1932) 32 CoL
L. REv. 573; Weiner, Theory of Anglo-American Didend Law (1930) 30 CoL L REV.
330, 339, 968. Usual depreciation for loss of efficiency is allowable, but this is to he
contrasted to the current replacement value, fluctuation of which may not be considered.
Id. at 340.
11. Weiner, Theory of Anglo-American Dkidend Law (1930) 30 COL L Rm-. 954,
968. See Berle and Fisher, supra note 10, at 573.
12. See Berle and Fisher, supra note 10, at 582: Greenough and Ayer, Fu:ds Avail-
able for Corporate Dividends in Washington (1934) 9 W.Asu. L Rm. 63, 83; Weiner,
Theory of Anglo-American Dividend Law (1930) 30 COL L REy. 954, 965.
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the classification should be based upon the intended use of the security. Thus,
it has been contended that long term securities, such as bonds, should be
valued as fixed assets, whereas stocks held for speculative purposes with a
rapid turnover contemplated, as in the instant case, should be considered
current assets.13 Under this rationale the taxpayer's assets must be valued
at market, and his status as an insolvent subject to the disability of the statute
cannot be questioned.
Even though the taxpayer is correct as to the applicability of the Texas
dividend restriction,' 4 the resulting apparent conflict between the federal
Revenue Act 15 and the state corporation law disappears upon close inspection
of the terminology of the Revenue Act. The offense at which the penalty tax
is aimed is not failure to declare dividends, but is either the formation of a
corporation or the employment of an existing corporate structure for the
purpose of evading imposition of a surtax on stockholders.1 0 Consequently,
once the illegal purpose in formation of the corporation is established that
fact per se invokes the penalty.T Any facts occurring subsequent to the act
of incorporation seem totally irrelevant to a determination of the applicability
of the penalty except insofar as they may throw light on the purpose for
which the corporation was formed, or the use to which the corporation was
put. Since the- Board of Tax Appeals expressly found that the corporation
had originally been formed for an illegal purpose, it was undoubtedly correct
in holding that the corporation's subsequent inability to distribute dividends
constituted no reprieve for a violation-formation with an intent to evade
surtax-already committed.' 8
13. See REITER, PROFITS, DIVIDENDS AND TmE LAW (1926) 178. Reluctance to accept
market valuation of security assets before the depression was based on the fear of per-
mitting dividends to be distributed from unrealized appreciation. See Hills, Dividends
from Unrealized Capital Appreciation (1928) 6 N. Y., L. REv. 155, 193. But former
fears no longer exist. With present emphasis upon asset depreciation, the few cases on
the subject have valued security assets at market. Irving Trust Co. v. Gunder, 152
Misc. 83, 271 N. Y. Supp. 795 (Sup. Ct. 1934): Vogtman v. Merchants' Mortgage &
Credit Co., 20 Del. Ch. 364, 178 Atl. 99 (1935). See 11 FLETCHER, COM'ORATIONS (Pern.
ed. 1931) §§ 5335, 5344.
14. TEx. AxN..Rav. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1347.
15. 47 STAT. 195 (1932).
16. "If any corporation, however created or organized, is formed or availed of for
the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon its shareholders through the
medium of permitting its gains and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or
distributed, there shall be levied, collected, and paid for each taxable year upon the net
income of such corporation, a tax equal to 50 per centum of the amount thereof." 47
STAT. 195 (1932).
17. Saenger, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 84 F. (2d) 23, 24 (C. C, A.
5th, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 577 (1936). In the early stages of enforcing these
provisions they were interpreted to require both intention and accumulation. Tway Coal
Sales Co. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 668 (W. D. Ky. 1933). See Sherman, supra
note 1, at 25. This misconception was shortly corrected. United States v. Tway Sales
Co., 75 F. (2d) 336 (C. C.A. 6th, 1935).
18. In Nipoch Corporation, 36 B.T.A. 662 (1937), the same result was reached
in a similar situation.
In the instant case the Board's determination of an illegal intent in forma-
tion was predicated to a large extent upon a statutory presumption"0 by means
of which proof that a corporation is a holding or investment company is
prina facie evidence that the condemned purpose is present. 0 Where this
presumption is successfully rebutted by a holding company or where the
presumption has no applicability because the corporation is an operating
company, liability for the penalty must be imposed, if at all, in terms of a
violation of the second proscribed activity-availing of an existing corporate
structure to evade the surtax.2 ' The legal disability of a taxpayer to distribute
dividends cannot be lightly dismissed from consideration in a proceeding
under this clause.
In the first place, the presence of the dividend restriction would seem to
eliminate any possibility of invoking another presumption which the statute
creates when there is evidence of an unreasonable accumulation.!- Certainly
no accumulation required by legal mandate can be termed unreasonable. In
addition the phrase "availed of" as used in the Act seems to require an
element of free choice on the taxpayer's part to constitute a violation. In the
absence of other facts, passive submission to the statutory imposition of a
dividend restriction can hardly be termed an availing of the corporation to
avoid a surtax even though evidence be introduced to show that the taxpayer
welcomed the consequent freedom from the necessity of paying dividends.
But proof that securities were transferred to the corporation in an effort to
evade the surtax would probably invoke the penalty despite the fact that the
only accumulation which followed resulted from compliance with the dividend
restriction23 An overt attempt to accomplish the condemned purpose and
19. Blaffer & Co., 37 B. T. A., May 17, 1938.
20. 47 STAT. 195 (1932). This presumption was first enacted in the Revenue Act
of 1924 and has been retained in the subsequent Acts. 381 C. C.H. 1938 Fed. TM. Serv-
fi 674.02. It has been suggested that the utility of this presumption is negligible because
the burden of proof is alwvays upon the taxpayer since the Commissioner's computation
is presumed to be correct. Graubard, supra note 5, at 416; Sherman, supra note 1, at 45.
This contention is of doubtful validity, however, since the statutory presumption not only
shifts the burden of proof to the tax-payer but provides prima facie evidence for the
Commissioner. Under the 1938 Revenue Act the presumption is given the weight not of
prima fade but positive evidence. 52 STAT. 483, 26 U. S. C. A. § 104 (c) (Supp. 1938).
21. United Business Corp. of America, 19 B. T. A. 809 (1930), aff'd, 62 F. (2d)
754 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 635 (1933); Edmond G. S%,artz, Inc.,
33 B. T. A. 355 (1935); National Grocery Co., 35 B. T. A. 163 (1936), reAI, 92 F. (2d)
931 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937), ree'd, 58 Sup. Ct. 932 (U. S. 1938).
22. 47 STAT. 195 (1932). See note 20, .supra. This presumption was not invoked
where an operating company was unable legally to distribute dividends. Spitzner & Sons,
Inc., 37 B. T. A., March 92, 1938.
23. Rands, Inc., 34 B. T. A. 1094 (1936). In this case it appeared that there was
sufficient evidence to justify a finding of purpose aside from the fact that earnings had
been retained due to dividend restrictions. But the Board of Tax Appeals, unfortunately,
based its imposition of the tax upon the fact that the accumulation actually effectuated a
tax saving to the shareholders. See R. & L., Inc., 33 B. T. A. 857, 3 (1935). The fact
that loans have been made from the corporation to its principal owners has usually beeni
considered a strong indication that a purpose to permit individual tax-saving e.isted.
De3fille Productions, Inc., 30 B. T. A. 826, 829 (1934) ; National Grocery Co., 35 B. T. A.
NVOTES 11091939]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
not necessarily accomplishment itself seems to be the gravamen of the
offense.
2 4
Though imposition of the penalty in the instant case is required by the
express terms of the Revenue Act, it may well be argued that application of
such a heavy tax defeats the very purpose of the dividend restriction in
question. The design underlying the Texas law is to retain among corporate
assets a sum equivalent to the original amount received by the corporation
for its shares of stock as a protection for creditors and a guarantee to the
stockholders that the corporation will continue to operate. 25 This plea lacks
force as to the stockholders, for the very fact that a corporation is employed
as a tax-escape for its owners indicates the extent of their direct control and
reduces any fear for their welfare to absurdity. The position of creditors of
the corporation, on the other hand, "may well be jeopardized by the imposition
of the tax. But even here the argument is not always persuasive since credi-
tors, when dealing with a closely owned holding company, as in the instant
case, typically look not to the corporation but to its owners for satisfaction.20
In those cases where application of the tax does jeopardize the security of
creditors, the possible harm which may befall them seems far outweighed by
the benefit which will redound to the government through successful discour-
agement of tax evasion. A similar regard for a stable source of governmental
revenue prompted Congress to subject the income of corporations with capital
deficits to the ordinary income tax levy, though the same danger to creditors
as in the instant situation results.2 7 Viewed in this light the decision in the
instant case seems not only legally sound but also economically desirable. "8
163 (1936). But see Tway Coal Sales Co. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 668, 669 (W. D.
Ky. 1933). See Graubard, supra note 5, at 418.
24. Spitzner & Sons, Inc., 37 B. T. A., March 22, 1938. DeMille Productions, Inc.,
31 B.T.A. 1161, 1174 (1935), aff'd, 90 F. (2d) 12 (C.C.A. 9th, 1937).
25. See MARPLE, CAPITAL SURPLUS AND CORPORATE NET WoRTi (1936) 5; Ballan-
tine and Hills, Corporate Capital and Restrictions Upon Dividends under Modern Cor-
poration Laws (1935) 23 CALIF. L. REV. 229; Weiner, Theory of Anglo-A enrican
Dividend Law (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 461.
26. Blaffer & Co., 37 B. T. A., May 17, 1938; Farish & Co., 38 B. T. A., July 22,
1938. See Weiner, Theor~y of Anglo-American Dividend Law (1928) 28 COL. L. Rnv.
1046, 1059.
27. Willcuts v. Milton Dairy Co., 275 U. S. 215 (1927); Long Beach Improvement
Co., 5 B. T. A. 590 (1926). See PAUL AND MERTENS. Op. cit. supra note 2, at § 11.03,
n. 14, (1938 Cum. Supp.) § 32 A. 44, n. 89. Under the personal holding company tax [see
note 7, supra] capital impairment does not bar imposition. Foley Securities Corporation,
38 B. T. A., Oct. 26, 1938. Nor was capital impairment preventing dividend distribution
recognized as a credit under the undistributed profits tax. 381 C. C. H. 1938 Fed. Tax
Serv. 30. See Hendricks, The Surtax on Undistributed Profits of Corporations (1936)
46 YALE L. J. 19; Legis. (1936) 36 COL L. REv. 1321; Legis. (1936) 50 HAV. L, REV.
332.
28. The instant case must be distinguished from the situation in which a capital deficit
has resulted from past operating losses. Until such losses are made up there is no taxable
income. PAUL AND MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 6.39. The penalty tax will nt he
imposed where a holding corporation has rebutted the presumption that it was illegally
created and has past operating losses that impair capital. Purpose to avail of the cor-
poration was not found merely from fact that earnings were used to repair these losses.
Farish & Co., 38 B. T. A. July 22, 1938.
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